Action plan for deriving dynamic RES-E policies by White, Sara et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This Energie publication is one of a series highlighting the potential for innovative non-nuclear energy technologies to become widely 
applied and contribute superior services to the citizen. European Commission strategies aim at influencing the scientific and engi-
neering communities, policy-makers and key market players to create, encourage, acquire and apply cleaner, more efficient and 
more sustainable energy solutions for their own benefit and that of our wider society. 
Funded under the European Union’s Fifth Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration 
(RTD), Energie’s range of support covers research, development, demonstration, dissemination, replication and market uptake — 
the full process of converting new ideas into practical solutions to real needs. Its publications, in print and electronic form, dissemi-
nate the results of actions carried out under this and previous framework programmes, including former JOULE-Thermie actions. 
Jointly managed by the European Commission’s Directorates-General for Energy and Transport and for Research, Energie has a to-
tal budget of EUR 1 042 million over the period 1998-2002. 
Delivery is organised principally around two key actions, ‘Cleaner energy systems, including renewable energies’ and ‘Economic and 
efficient energy for a competitive Europe’, within the theme ‘Energy, environment and sustainable development’, supplemented by 
coordination and cooperative activities of a sectoral and cross-sectoral nature. With targets guided by the Kyoto Protocol and asso-
ciated policies, Energie’s integrated activities are focused on new solutions which yield direct economic and environmental benefits 
to the energy user, and strengthen European competitive advantage by helping to achieve a position of leadership in the energy 
technologies of tomorrow. The resulting balanced improvements in energy, environmental and economic performance will help to 
ensure a sustainable future for Europe’s citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ENERGIE 
 
with the support of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
Directorate-General for Research 
 
LEGAL NOTICE 
 
Neither the European Commission, nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission, 
is responsible for the use which might be made of the information contained in this publication. The views expressed in this publica-
tion have not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as a statement of the  
Commission’s views. 
 
 
© Vienna University of Technology, Energy Economics Group (EEG), 2004 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Printed in Austria 
 
 
Scientific Co-ordination: 
Claus Huber 
Energy Economics Group, Austria 
E-mail: Huber@eeg.tuwien.ac.at  
Telephone: +43 58 801-373 60  
Facsimile:  +43 58 801-373 97 
 - i - 
  
 
 
  
 
The Green-X project: 
Research project within the 5th Framework Programme of the European Commission, DG Research  
Contract No:   ENG2-CT-2002-00607 
Duration:    October 2002 – September 2004 
Co-ordination:  Reinhard Haas, Energy Economics Group (EEG), Institute of Power Systems and Energy  
     Economics, Vienna University of Technology. 
Project partners: - EEG - Energy Economics Group, Institute of Power Systems and Energy Economics,  
      Vienna University of Technology, Austria 
     - IT Power, United Kingdom 
     -  KEMA - KEMA Nederland B.V., The Netherlands 
     - RISOE - Risoe National Laboratory, Denmark 
     - CSIC - The Spanish Council for Scientific Research (Institute of Economy and Geography), 
      Spain 
     - FhG-ISI - Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, Germany 
     - WIENSTROM GmbH, Austria 
     - EGL - Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft Laufenburg AG, Switzerland 
     - EREC - European Renewable Energy Council, Belgium 
Contact/Information: web-site: http://www.green-x.at 
      or directly by contacting one of the project partners 
 
Imprint: 
Energy Economics Group (EEG), Institute of Power Systems and Energy Economics, Vienna University of  
Technology. 
Gusshausstrasse 25-29 / 373-2, A-1040 Vienna, Austria 
Printed in Austria – 2004 
Photography (cover page) by Gustav Resch 
 - ii - 
 - iii - 
Table of Contents 
 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................1 
1.1 Outline of this report...........................................................................................................................1 
2 Electricity generation from RES in EU 15  Member States ......................................................................2 
2.1 Historical development of electricity generation from RES .................................................................2 
2.2 Future potential of RES-E in EU 15 Member States...........................................................................3 
3 Survey of RES-E promotion strategies......................................................................................................4 
3.1 Background........................................................................................................................................4 
3.2 Classification of  promotion strategies................................................................................................4 
3.3 Currently implemented  support schemes in  EU 15 countries...........................................................5 
4 Method of approach....................................................................................................................................7 
4.1 Evaluation criteria...............................................................................................................................7 
4.2 The computer  programme Green-X...................................................................................................7 
5 Evaluation of different policies schemes in a dynamic framework ......................................................10 
5.1 Beneficial conditions for a successful RES-E deployment..................................................................10 
5.2 Comparison of support schemes......................................................................................................10 
5.3 Interactions of RES-E support, GHG policy, DSM activities and promotion of CHP...........................13 
6 Results from simulations with the Green-X toolbox on EU level..........................................................14 
6.1 Definition of scenarios......................................................................................................................14 
6.2 General scenario  assumptions........................................................................................................14 
6.3 Assumptions for simulated support schemes...................................................................................16 
6.4 Results - BAU target in 2020............................................................................................................17 
6.5 Results - 1.000 TWh target in 2020..................................................................................................21 
6.6 Effects of RES-E deployment on conventional power price and CO2 emissions...............................24 
7 Recommended actions and final conclusions .......................................................................................25 
7.1 Overcoming existing barriers............................................................................................................25 
7.2 Which instrument fits best? ..............................................................................................................27 
7.3 What can a harmonised approach look like?....................................................................................34 
7.4 Summary and final remarks .............................................................................................................35 
8 References.................................................................................................................................................36 
 
 - iv - 
  
 - 1 - 
1 Introduction 
At the EU level, the ’Directive of the European Par-
liament and the Council on the promotion of electric-
ity from renewable energy sources in the internal 
electricity market (RES-E Directive)’ (European Par-
liament and Council, 2001 – Directive 2001/77/EC) 
sets a minimum framework for RES-E policy. How-
ever, in line with the Principle of Subsidiary, it allows 
each Member State to choose the support scheme, 
which “corresponds best to its particular situation”.  
Quite a number of different instruments are being 
used in the attempt by the individual countries and 
the EU to support the development of renewable en-
ergy technologies and at the same time to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The most important ones 
are mentioned below: 
• Feed-in tariffs 
• Tradable green certificates 
• Tendering systems 
• Emissions trading schemes / tradable emission 
allowances 
These policy instruments may be used individually or 
simultaneously either at the national level or at the 
EU level. Moreover, the Member States and the EU 
may want to achieve not only one but several targets 
in applying these instruments. For example, this is 
the case for the indicative targets for the use of re-
newable energy and the national GHG-reduction tar-
gets.  
Analysing the interaction of these instruments with 
each other and with different targets is not trivial. In-
stead, such analyses turn out to be highly complex 
theoretically and methodologically. The many instru-
ments that exist to support renewable energy tech-
nologies and they interact at multiple levels. The 
most important ones being: 
• Prices at the power spot market 
• Consumer prices for electricity 
• The volume of implemented renewable power 
capacity 
• The national and international GHG emission 
levels;  
The core objective of this project is to facilitate a con-
tinuous and significant increase in the share of RES-
E with minimal costs to European citizen. To identify 
the most important strategies (e.g. Tradable Green 
Certificates, Feed-In Tariffs, Investment Subsidies, 
Emissions Trading, CO2-taxes) in a dynamic way the 
computer-based toolbox Green-X has been devel-
oped. Although within the scope of this project it has 
not been feasible to investigate all possible issues 
within this field, the cases analysed cover not only 
the needs and opportunities at the level of the na-
tional Member States, but also those at the level of 
the EU. However, the most important ones have 
been treated thoroughly.  
This report, which is the final outcome from the 
Green-X project (Contract No: ENG2-CT-2002-
00607), with funding from the European Commission, 
DG Research, provides recommendations on the 
way forward for the promotion of renewable energy 
for electricity generation in the EU. It is addressed 
primarily to energy policy maker, as well as to other 
people interested in renewable energy and energy 
policy.  
 
1.1 Outline of this report 
This report is divided into 8 chapters. After a short in-
troduction, explaining the motivation and the objec-
tive of this project, chapter 2 summarised the current 
electricity generation from RES-E in the EU 15 as 
well as the future potential up to 2020. A survey on 
different types of promotion strategies and policy in-
struments historically and currently applied within EU 
member states is given in chapter 3. The method of 
approach is explained in chapter 4. Firstly, the criteria 
used to evaluate the different policy schemes are de-
fined. Secondly, the core product of this project, the 
Green-X computer model is presented in brief. Its 
structure and the methodology are elaborated and il-
lustrative Figures provide an impression of how the 
model looks. Chapter 5 evaluates the different policy 
schemes in a dynamic framework and describes the 
effects of the support mechanisms for RES-E. The 
main results from simulations with the Green-X com-
puter programme are presented in chapter 6, using 
two different targets: business as usual (BAU) and an 
ambitious RES-E target for 2020. To analyse the ef-
fects of the different policy instruments, these targets 
would be reached by applying different support 
schemes. Finally, the main conclusions and recom-
mendations resulting from this study are derived in 
chapter 7. It includes ‘action plans’ describing policy 
adjustments needed to implement the recommenda-
tions. 
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2 Electricity generation from RES in EU 15  
Member States 
Before an assessment and a discussion about effi-
cient and effective RES-E policy should take place 
the historical development, the current situation and 
the future perspectives of RES-E in EU 15 Member 
States are described briefly.  
 
2.1 Historical development of 
electricity generation from 
RES 
The historical RES-E data are based on a compre-
hensive data-collection (Eurostat (2003), IEA (2002) 
and statistical information gained on national level). 
Regarding the years 2003 to 2005, as only few data 
are available on country and technology level ‘fore-
cast’ is based on a Green-X model run.  
The (projected) electricity generation by RES-E cate-
gory for the year 2004 is shown in Figure 2.1 on 
country level. Figure 2.2 depicts the corresponding 
development of RES-E in total EU-15 over time (from 
1990 to 2004) – with (left hand side) and without hy-
dropower (right hand side). 
Two countries, Austria and Sweden, generate more 
than a third of electricity from these sources; others a 
much lower proportion. The largest share of RES is 
still provided by ‘large-scale’ hydropower (i.e. with 
capacities larger than 10MW). Such plants have 
mostly been established before the post-1980’s ‘new’ 
RES-E. Besides hydropower, biomass, biowaste and 
wind are currently the most important. There are a 
number of noteworthy observations including:  
• the large proportions of operating wind power in 
Denmark, Spain, and Germany 
• the significant contribution of geothermal power in 
Italy 
• the relative high proportion of RES-E generated 
from biomass (incl. biowaste and biogas) in the 
UK, Finland, Sweden and Germany.  
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Figure 2.1 Electricity generation (achieved potential) from various RES in EU countries in 2004.  
Source: Own investigations; Eurostat, 2004, Green-X model run 
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Figure 2.2 Electricity generation from RES in EU-15 countries from 1990 to 2004 – including (left hand side) & 
excluding (right hand side) hydro. Source: Own investigations; Eurostat, 2004, Green-X model run.  
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Figure 2.3 Achieved (2004) & additional mid-term RES-E potential (up to 2020) in EU-15 countries –  
by country (left) and by RES-E category (right) 
 
2.2 Future potential of RES-E in 
EU 15 Member States 
An overview on the different RES-E options available 
in total EU-15 up to 2020 is given in Figure 2.3. In the 
entire EU 15 the already achieved potential for RES-
E equals 448 TWh1, whereas the additional realis-
able potential up to 2020 amounts to 1078 TWh. Cur-
rently hydro power is the dominant technology but 
with limited future potential. The large (future) poten-
tial of wind energy (incl. on- and offshore), solid bio-
mass and biogas may contribute to a large extent. In 
addition, new technologies like wave power and tidal 
stream or solar thermal electricity are yet to be de-
veloped in the EU. 
                                                          
1 The electricity generation potential represents the output potential 
of all plants installed up to the end of each year. Of course, figures 
for actual generation and generation potentials differ in most cases 
– due to the fact that in contrast to the actual data, potential figures 
represent, e.g. in case of hydropower, the normal hydrological con-
ditions, and furthermore, not all plants are installed at the beginning 
of each year. 
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3 Survey of RES-E promotion strategies 
3.1 Background 
It is well known that RES-E requires public support in 
order to penetrate the electricity market. This has 
been recognised at the EU level and by the individual 
EU 15 Member States, which have been promoting 
RES-E for many years.  
At the EU level, a ’Directive of the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on the promotion of electricity 
from renewable energy sources in the internal elec-
tricity market (RES-E Directive)’ (European Parlia-
ment and Council, 2001 – Directive 2001/77/EC) was 
approved in 2001, setting targets for the deployment 
of renewable electricity by 2010. In addition, the Di-
rective states that, taking account of the wide diver-
sity of promotion schemes between Member States, 
it is too early to set a Community-wide framework re-
garding support schemes. By 27th October 2005 the 
Commission should present a report on the experi-
ence gained with the application and coexistence of 
different support schemes in the Member States. The 
report may be accompanied by a proposal for a 
Community framework for RES support schemes 
(art.4.2).  
Therefore, at least in the short to medium term, sup-
port policies in Member States will continue to be 
crucial for the penetration of RES in the electricity 
market2.  
 
3.2 Classification of  
promotion strategies 
 
  Price-driven Capacity-driven
Investment 
focussed 
• Rebates 
• Tax incentives • Tender systems 
R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
Generation 
based 
• Feed-in tariffs 
• Production tax 
incentives 
• Quotas (RPS) 
based on TGC 
• Tender systems
Investment 
focussed 
• Shareholder 
Programs 
• Contribution 
Programs 
V
ol
un
ta
ry
 
Generation 
based • Green tariffs 
 
Table 3.1 Classification of promotion strategies 
for RES-E 
 
These policies can be classified according to different 
criteria (i.e., whether they affect demand or supply of 
RES-E or whether they support capacity or genera-
                                                          
2 The ‘RES-E Directive’ also contains several prescriptions regard-
ing mandatory guarantees of origin, ensuring grid access and re-
porting obligations. 
tion). Support schemes can be grouped in several 
categories – see also Table 3.1: 
• Investment incentives establish an incentive for 
the development of renewable energy projects as 
a percentage over total costs, or as an amount of 
Euros per installed kW. The levels of these incen-
tives are usually technology-specific and may 
vary significantly between regions. 
• Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) are generation based fixed 
price incentives that usually take the form of ei-
ther a total price for renewable production, or an 
additional premium on top of the electricity mar-
ket price paid to RES-E producers. Besides the 
height of the tariff its guaranteed duration repre-
sents an important parameter for an appraisal of 
the actual financial incentive (compare for exam-
ple the case of Spain and Germany). Further-
more, feed-in tariffs easily allow technology-
specific promotion as well as an acknowledge-
ment of future cost-reductions by implementing 
decreasing tariffs. 
• Production tax incentives are generation-based 
price-driven mechanisms that work through pay-
ment exemptions of electricity taxes applied to all 
producers. This type of instrument differs from 
feed-in schemes in terms of the cash flow of 
RES-E producers, since it represents a minus 
cost instead of an additional income. 
• Tendering systems can either be investment-
focussed or generation-based, but in both cases 
they are capacity-driven mechanisms. In the first 
case, a fixed amount of capacity to be installed is 
announced and contracts are given following a 
predefined bidding process, which offers winners 
a set of favourable investment conditions, includ-
ing investment subsidies per installed kW. The 
generation based tendering systems work in a 
similar way. However, instead of providing one-
time investment incentive, they offer a ‘bid price’ 
per kWh given to winner projects that may re-
ceive it through out the duration of the contract. 
• Quota obligations based on Tradable Green Cer-
tificates (TGCs) are generation-based capacity-
driven instruments. These instrument are usually 
implemented through government defined targets 
and obligations on consumers or suppliers of 
electricity. Once defined, a parallel market for re-
newable energy certificates is established and 
their price is set following demand and supply 
conditions (forced by the obligation). 
Besides these regulatory instruments voluntary ap-
proaches appear today which are mainly based on 
the willingness of consumers to pay premium rates 
for renewable energy. Nevertheless, so far in terms 
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of effectiveness – i.e. actual installations resulting 
from their appliance – their impact on total RES-E 
development is negligible.  
In the following section a short overview is given on 
currently implemented promotion strategies for  
RES-E in the EU-15 countries. Table 3.2 provides a 
brief overview on this topic – listing countries, promo-
tion strategies and the technologies addressed. 
 
3.3 Currently implemented  
support schemes in  
EU 15 countries 
Almost all countries have implemented some type of 
investment subsidy for technologies in their early 
phase of development, such as tidal stream and 
wave energy, photovoltaics, solar thermal electricity 
or offshore wind. 
The most widespread mechanism promoting renew-
ables production has traditionally been the so-called 
feed-in tariff systems. The countries that have been 
more successful in deploying RES-E are character-
ised by relatively high (feed-in) incentive-levels and 
long-term stable frameworks (Germany, Denmark & 
Spain are good examples in the development of wind 
energy). 
Tax incentives are applied in Finland, Netherlands 
and the UK. In Finland the tax break works almost as 
a feed-in scheme reducing the real cost of renew-
ables significantly. In the Netherlands and the UK, 
the tax break is a small part of a broader scheme. In 
the first case, the tax reduction provides a ‘minus 
cost’ of about 20 €/MWh to renewable producers, 
which in combination with the feed-in scheme repre-
sents the basic renewables incentive. In the case of 
the UK, the Climate Change Levy provides some 
6.3 €/MWh exemption to renewable producers in ad-
dition to the revenues from the TGC system. 
Tendering systems have been applied in France for 
onshore wind projects, and are currently applied in 
Ireland through the AER scheme. According to recent 
discussions in Denmark and France, it is planned to 
reapply this type of instrument for offshore wind pro-
jects.  
Finally, quota systems based on Tradable Green 
Certificates (TGCs) schemes are applied in the UK 
(replacing the NFFO tendering system), Belgium, It-
aly and Sweden. 
The reasons behind this apparent variety have been 
explored to different degrees and include:  
• Technology and country specificity – different 
stages of development and costs, differing local 
resource conditions.  
• Political willingness and coherence – countries 
which have undergone past liberalisations and 
are embedded into market oriented policies (UK, 
Ireland) are prone to apply capacity-driven 
schemes as quotas based on TGCs; and,  
• Unlevelled electricity markets – Important differ-
ences appear when analysing the individual 
EU15 electricity markets in terms of their work-
arrangements, institutional set-ups and fiscal 
schemes (heterogeneous energy tax levels). 
From a technological point-of-view, RES-E options 
that receive greater attention in the EU15 are: wind, 
photovoltaics, small hydro and biomass in its different 
forms. 
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Table 3.2 Current promotion strategies for RES-E in the EU-15 countries 
RES-E TECHNOLOGIES CONSIDERED  Major  
strategy Large 
Hydro Small Hydro 
‘New’ RES (Wind on- & offshore, PV, Solar thermal electricity, 
Biomass, Biogas, Landfill gas, Sewage gas, Geothermal) 
Municipal 
Solid Waste 
Austria FITs No Renewable Energy Act 2003. (Ökostromgesetz). Technology-specific FITs guaranteed for 
13 years for plants which get all permissions between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 
2004 and, hence, start operation by the end of 2006. Investment subsidies mainly on 
regional level. 
FITs for waste 
with a high 
biodegrad-
able fraction 
Belgium Quota/TGC 
+ guaran-
teed elec-
tricity pur-
chase 
No Federal: The Royal Decree of 10 July 2002 (operational from 1st of July 2003) sets minimum prices for 
RES-E. Except for offshore wind it will be implemented by the regional authorities: Wallonia: Quota obliga-
tion (based on TGCs) on electricity suppliers – increasing from 3% in 2003 up to 12% in 2010. Flanders: 
Quota obligation (based on TGCs) on electricity suppliers – increasing from 3% (no MSW) in 2004 up to 6% 
in 2010. Brussels region: No support scheme yet implemented. 
Denmark FITs No Act on Payment for Green Electricity (Act 478): Fix settlement prices instead of former high 
FITs. Valid for 10 years. Tendering plans for offshore wind. 
No 
Finland Tax  
Exemption 
No Tax refund:  
4.2 € /MWh  
(plant <1MW) 
Mix of tax refund and investment subsidies:Tax refund of 6.9 €/MWh 
for Wind and of 4.2 €/MWh for other RES-E. Investment subsidies 
up to 40% for Wind and up to 30 % for other RES-E. 
Tax refund 
(2.5 €/MWh) 
France FITs No FITs for RES-E plant < 12 MW guaranteed for 15 years (20 years PV and Hydro). Tenders 
for plant >12 MW. FITs in more detail: Biomass: 49-61 €/MWh, Biogas: 46-58 €/MWh, Geo-
thermal: 76-79 €/MWh, PV: 152.5-305 €/MWh; Landfill gas: 45-57.2 €/MWh; Wind3: 30.5-
83.8 €/MWh; Hydro4: 54.9-61 €/MWh. Investment subsidies for PV, Biomass and Biogas 
(Biomass and Biogas PBEDL 2000-2006). 
FIT: 25.8-
47.2 €/MWh 
Germany FITs Only  
refur-
bishment 
German Renewable Energy Act: FITs guaranteed for 20 years5. In more detail, FITs for 
new installations (2004) are: Hydro: 37-76.7 €/MWh; Wind6: 55-91 €/MWh; Biomass & Bio-
gas: 84-195 €/MWh; Landfill-, Sewage- & Mine gas: 66.5-96.7 €/MWh; PV & Solar thermal 
electricity: 457-574 €/MWh; Geothermal: 71.6-150 €/MWh 
No 
Greece FITs +  
investment 
subsidies 
No FITs guaranteed for 10 years (at a level of 70-90% of the consumer electricity price)7 and a 
mix of other instruments:  a) Law 2601/98: Up to 40% investment subsidies combined with 
tax measures;  b) CSF III: Up to 50% investment subsidies depending on RES type 
No 
Ireland Tender No Tendering scheme – currently AER VI with technology bands and price caps for small Wind 
(<3 MW), large Wind (>3 MW), small Hydro (<5 MWp), Biomass, Biomass CHP and Bio-
gas. In addition, tax relief for investments in RES-E. 
No 
Italy Quota/TGC Quota obligation (based on TGCs) on electricity suppliers: 2.35% target (2004), increasing yearly up to 2008; TGC is-
sued for all (new) RES-E (incl. large Hydro and MSW) – with rolling redemption8; penalty in size of 84.2 €/MWh (2004) 
but market distortions appear9. Investment subsidies for PV (Italian Roof Top program). 
Luxembourg FITs No No FITs10 guaranteed for 10 years (PV: 20 years) and investment sub-
sidies for Wind, PV, Biomass and small Hydro. FITs for Wind, Bio-
mass and small Hydro: 25 €/MWh, for PV: 450 €/MWh.  
No 
Netherlands FITs + tax 
exemption 
 Mixed strategy: Green pricing, tax exemptions and FITs. The tax exemption for green elec-
tricity amounts 30 €/MWh and FITs guaranteed for 10 years range from 29 €/MWh (for 
mixed Biomass and waste streams) to 68 €/MWh for other RES-E (e.g. Wind offshore, PV, 
Small Hydro). 
No 
Portugal FITs +  
investment 
subsidies 
No FITs (Decree law 339-C/2001 and Decree law 168/99) and investment subsidies of roughly 
40% (Measure 2.5 (MAPE) within program for Economic Activities (POE)) for Wind, PV, 
Biomass, Small Hydro and Wave. FITs in 2003: Wind11: 43-83 €/MWh; Wave: 225 €/MWh; 
PV12:224-410 €/MWh, Small Hydro: 72 €/MWh  
No 
Spain FITs Depend-
ing on 
the plant 
size13 
 
FITs (Royal Decree 2818/1998): RES-E producer have the right to opt for a fixed price or 
for a premium tariff14. Both are adjusted by the government according to the variation in the 
average electricity sale price. In more detail (only premium, valid for plant < 50 MW): Wind: 
27 €/MWh; PV15: 180-360 €c/kWh, Small Hydro: 29 €/MWh, Biomass: 25-33 €/MWh. More-
over, soft loans and tax incentives (according to “Plan de Fomento de las Energías 
Renovables”) and investment subsidies on a regional level 
Premium FIT: 
17 €/MWh 
Sweden Quota/TGC No Quota obligation (based on TGC) on consumers: Increasing from 7.4% in 2003 up to 16.9% 
in 2010. For Wind Investment subsidies of 15% and additional small premium FITs (“Envi-
ronmental Bonus”16) are available. 
No 
United Kingdom Quota/TGC No Quota obligation (based on TGCs) for all RES-E: Increasing from 3% in 2003 up to 10.4% 
by 2010 – penalty set at 30.5 £/MWh. In addition to the TGC system, eligible RES-E are 
exempt from the Climate Change Levy certified by Levy Exemption Certificates (LEC’s), 
which cannot be separately traded from physical electricity. The current levy rate is 
4.3 £/MWh. Investment grants in the frame of different programs (e.g. Clear Skies Scheme, 
DTI´s Offshore Wind Capital Grant Scheme, the Energy Crops Scheme, Major PV Demon-
stration Program and the Scottish Community Renewable Initiative) 
No 
 
                                                          
3 Stepped FIT: 83.8 €/MWh for the first 5 years of operation and then between 30.5 and 83.8 €/MWh depending on the quality of site. 
4 Producers can choose between four different schemes. The figure shows the flat rate option. Within other schemes tariffs vary over time 
(peak/base etc.). 
5 The law includes a dynamic reduction of the FITs (for some RES options): For biomass 1% per year, for PV 5% per year, for wind 2% per year. 
6 Stepped FIT: In case of onshore wind 87 €/MWh for the first 5 years of operation and then 55 to 87 €/MWh depending on the quality of site. 
7 Depending on location (islands or mainland) and type of producer (independent power producers or utilities) 
8 In general only plant put in operation after 1st of April 1999 are allowed to receive TGCs for their produced green electricity. Moreover, this al-
lowance is limited to the first 8 years of operation (rolling redemption). 
9 GRTN (Italian Transmission System Operator) influences strongly the certificates market selling its own certificates at a regulated price – 
namely at a price set by law as the average of the extra prices paid to acquire electricity from RES-E plant under the former FIT-programme 
(CIP6). 
10 Only valid for plants up to 3 MW (except PV: limited to 50 kW). 
11 Stepped FIT depending on the quality of the site. 
12 Depending on the size: <5kW: 420 €/MWh or >5kW: 224 €/MWh. 
13 Hydropower plant with a size between 10 and 50 MW receive a premium FIT of 6-29 €/MWh depending on the plant size. 
14 In case of a premium tariff, RES-E generators earn in addition to the (compared to fixed rate lower) premium tariff the revenues from the sell-
ing of their electricity on the power market. 
15 Depending on the plant size: <5kW: 360 €/MWh or >5kW: 180 €/MWh 
16 Decreasing gradually down to zero in 2007 
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4 Method of approach 
4.1 Evaluation criteria 
Support instruments have to be effective for increas-
ing the penetration of RES-E and efficient with re-
spect to minimising the resulting public costs (trans-
fer cost for society) over time. The criteria used for 
the evaluation of various instruments are based on 
the following conditions: 
► Minimise generation costs 
This aim is fulfilled if total RES-E generation 
costs (GC) are minimised. In other words, the 
system should provide incentives for investors to 
choose technologies, sizes and sites so that gen-
eration costs are minimised. 
► Lower producer profits 
If such cost-efficient systems are found, – in a 
second step – various options should be evalu-
ated with the aim to minimise transfer costs for 
consumer / society.17 This means that feed-in tar-
iffs, subsidies or trading systems should be de-
signed in a way that public transfer payments are 
also minimised. This implies lowering producer 
surplus (PS)18. 
 
quantity
[GWh/year]
price, costs 
[€/MWh]
Market clearing
price = price 
for certificate
MC
Quota Q
pC
MC ... marginal
generation costs 
pC ... market price for
(conventional)
electricity 
pMC ... marginal price for 
RES-E (due to
quota obligation) 
pMC
Generation Costs (GC)
Producer surplus (PS)
Transfer costs for consumer 
(additional costs for society) = PS + GC – pC * Q
 
Figure 4.1 Basic definitions of the cost elements 
(illustrated for a TGC system) 
 
                                                          
17 Transfer costs for consumer / society (sometimes also called ad-
ditional / premium costs for society in this report) are defined as di-
rect premium financial transfer costs from the consumer to the pro-
ducer due to the RES-E policy compared to the case that consum-
ers would purchase conventional electricity from the power market. 
This means that these costs do not consider any indirect costs or 
externalities (environmental benefits, change of employment, etc.). 
The transfer costs for society are either expressed in Mio €/year or 
related to the total electricity consumption. In the later case the pre-
mium costs refer to each MWh of electricity consumed. 
18 The producer surplus is defined as the profit of the green electric-
ity generators. If for example, a green producer receives a feed-in 
tariff of 60 € for each MWh of electricity he sells and his generation 
costs are 40 €/MWh, the resulting profit would be 20 € for each 
MWh. The sum of the profits of all green generators defines the 
producer surplus. 
In some cases both goals – minimise generation 
costs and producer surplus – may not be reached to-
gether so compromise solutions must be found. For a 
better illustration of the used cost definitions the vari-
ous cost elements are expressed in Figure 4.1. 
 
4.2 The computer  
programme Green-X  
The evaluation of the different promotion policy 
strategies and their trade-offs with other instruments 
and policies is based on both theoretical analysis car-
ried out within the project Green-X and the calcula-
tions made with the help of the computer model 
Green-X. Before these results are presented, the 
computer programme Green-X is briefly described.  
The Green-X computer model is the core product 
developed within the project Green-X. It is an inde-
pendent computer programme and allows to simulate 
different scenarios, which enable a comparative and 
quantitative analysis of the interactions between 
RES-E, CHP, DSM activities and GHG-reduction 
within the liberalised electricity sector both for the EU 
as a whole and individual EU 15 Member States19 
over time. Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the core 
elements of the Green-X model. 
The general modelling approach to describe both 
supply-side electricity generation technologies and 
electricity demand reduction options is to derive dy-
namic cost-resource curves for each generation and 
reduction option in the investigated region. Dynamic 
cost curves are characterised by the fact that the 
costs as well as the potential for electricity generation 
/ demand reduction can change year by year. The 
magnitude of these changes is given endogenously 
in the model, i.e. the difference in the values com-
pared to the previous year depends on the outcome 
of this year and the (policy) framework conditions set 
for the simulation year.  
Based on the derivation of the dynamic cost-resource 
curve an economic assessment takes place consid-
ering the scenario specific conditions like selected 
policy strategies, investor and consumer behaviour 
as well as primary energy and demand forecasts.  
                                                          
19 In the near future, it is planned to extend the geographical cover-
age of the model to the 10 new Member States, the candidate coun-
tries Bulgaria and Romania as well as Switzerland and Norway. A 
possible further extension to other neighbouring countries such as, 
e.g. the Balkan states and Turkey seems likely later-on. 
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Economic
assessment
supply-side 
per technology
potential, costs, 
offer prices
Economic
assessment
demand-side
per sub-sector
demand elasticity,
switch prices
Trade-offs
link of different technologies and 
markets (supply and demand)
RES-E, CHP, DSM, 
power market, TEA
Results Costs and Benefits
on a yearly basis (2004 -2020 )
Scenario selection on a yearly basis (2004 -2020)
Framework conditions 
(primary energy prices, 
electricity demand etc.)
Investor and consumer  
behaviour Policy strategies
Feedback year n+1 Fe
ed
ba
ck
 ye
ar
 n+
1
Determination 
of cost-
resource
curves year n  
supply-side
per technology
RES-E
CHP
Conv. power
Determination 
of cost-
resource
curves year n  
demand-side
per sub-sector
Industry
Household
Tertiary
Database Costs (basis 2004) and Potential (basis 2020)
Supply  technologies (RES-E, CHP, 
conventional power)
Options reducing 
electricity demand (DSM) 
 
Figure 4.2 Overview on the computer model Green-X 
 
Policies that can be selected are the most important 
price-driven strategies (feed-in tariffs, tax incentives, 
investment subsidies, subsidies on fuel input) and 
demand-driven strategies (quota obligations based 
on tradable green certificates (including international 
trade), tendering schemes). All instruments can be 
applied to all RES and conventional options sepa-
rately for both combined heat power and power pro-
duction only. In addition, general taxes including en-
ergy taxes (to be applied to all primary energy carri-
ers as well as to electricity and heat) and environ-
mental taxes on CO2-emissions, policies supporting 
demand-side measures and climate policy options 
(trading of emission allowances on both the national 
and international level) can be adjusted and the ef-
fects simulated.20 As Green-X represents a dynamic 
simulation tool, the user has the possibility to change 
policy and parameter settings within a simulation run 
(i.e. by year). Furthermore, all instruments can be set 
for each country individually. 
Within this step, a transition from generation and sav-
ing costs to bids, offers and switch prices takes 
place. It is worth to mention that the policy setting, 
e.g. the guaranteed duration and the stability of the 
                                                          
20 Thereby, various instrument-specific parameters can be defined, 
such as for example, in the case of a quota obligation the reference 
point of the quota (as share of total demand or generation), the im-
posed penalty in the case of non-compliance with the quota, etc. 
planning horizon or the kind of policy instrument, 
which will be applied, influences the effective support.  
The results on a yearly basis are derived by deter-
mining the equilibrium level of supply and demand 
within each considered market segment – e.g. trad-
able green certificate market (TGC both national and 
international), electricity power market, tradable 
emissions permit market. This means that the differ-
ent technologies are collected within each market 
and the point of equilibrium varies with the calculated 
demand. 
In more detail, the Green-X model provides the fol-
lowing outputs for each Member State and for the 
European Union as a whole as well as for each tech-
nology on a yearly base up to 2020: 
• General results, including:  
– Installed capacity [MW] 
– Total fuel input electricity generation [TJ, MW]  
– Total electricity generation [GWh] 
– National electricity consumption [GWh] 
– Import / export electricity balance [GWh, 
% of gen.] 
– Total CO2-emissions from electricity genera-
tion compared to selected scenario baseline 
(BAU, Kyoto-target, etc.) [%] 
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– Market price electricity (yearly 
average price) [€/MWh] 
– Market price Tradable Green 
Certificates [€/MWh] 
• Impact on producer, including: 
– Total electricity generation 
costs [M€, €/MWh] 
– Total producer surplus for elec-
tricity generation [M€, €/MWh] 
– Marginal generation costs per 
technology for electricity gen-
eration [€/MWh] 
• Impact on consumer, including: 
– Additional costs due to promo-
tion of RES-E [M€, €/MWh] 
– Additional costs due to DSM 
strategy [M€, €/MWh] 
– Additional costs due to CO2-
strategy [M€, €/MWh] 
– Total (transfer) costs due to the 
selected support schemes and 
policy options [M€] 
 
For illustration of the computer model, 
some screen-shots are copied in 
Figure 4.3 to Figure 4.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Design options in the 
case of a feed-in tariff 
 
Figure 4.4 Result table  - country specific results 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Result table - technology specific results on  
country level 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Result figure – technology specific distribution per 
country 
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5 Evaluation of different policies schemes in a 
dynamic framework 
Investor
• Appropriate financial support
• High investor confidence
• Simple and transparent design
• Continuous RES-E policy
Society and policy
• Low transfer costs for power consumer
• High public acceptance
• Encouraging local and regional benefits
• High effectiveness in RES-E deployment
Market
• High conformity with power market 
and other policies
• No discrimination 
• Separation of support schemes in 
the transition process
Long term strategies and
technological development
• Comparable high conformity with power
market and other policies
• Encouraging lower manufacturing costs
• Integration of other policies
Total 
company
risk
Successful
RES-E
deployment
 
Figure 5.1 Beneficial conditions for a successful RES-E deployment.  
 
5.1 Beneficial conditions for a 
successful RES-E deployment 
In the long-term a substantial penetration of RES-E 
technologies can only take place if framework condi-
tions are set such that various barriers in the different 
areas will be removed. This ‘institutional context’ is-
sue is of high relevance. Beneficial conditions and 
criteria for a successful RES-E deployment are de-
picted in Figure 5.1 and summarised in Table 5.1 and 
Table 5.2. 
 
5.2 Comparison of support 
schemes 
There is no clear favourite support scheme; each in-
strument has its pro and cons. Most important differ-
ences among the analysed support schemes are:  
• In contrast to a feed-in tariff scheme or a tender 
procedure, no adjustment is necessary to fulfil 
targets under a quota obligation if the penalty 
(penalties) is set right; 
• From society’s perspective, the cost effectiveness 
of the support scheme depends on the target that 
should be met. The RES-E target greatly influ-
ences the cost effectiveness of the applied in-
strument.21 
• A tender scheme (based on price bids) repre-
sents a mix between a feed-in tariff (the price is 
guaranteed by a contract, hence, the risk and un-
certainty about the economic conditions are low) 
and a TGC system (competition among the inves-
tors exist). A tender scheme (based on price 
bids) is similar to a stepped feed-in tariff, but with 
the difference that the granted price for RES-E 
                                                          
21 In the case of ‘low’ targets similar costs for society occur, irre-
spective of the chosen strategy. In the case of ‘high’ targets costs 
depend (significantly) on the chosen instrument and its design 
will be determined by the market itself and not by 
a regulatory authority.22  
• Generation costs can be minimised in the early 
phase of RES-E deployment by avoiding a differ-
entiation among the promotion of the different 
RES-E options. In practise, a TGC system fits 
best due to the competitive character. In the long 
term higher generation costs may occur as alter-
native RES-E potentials can not be used at time.  
• Feed-in tariffs and tender schemes are useful in 
promoting a more homogeneous distribution 
among different technologies by setting technol-
ogy-specific guaranteed tariffs. The long-term 
technology development of various RES, which 
are currently not cost-efficient, can be stimulated 
by implementing such a policy. This can be es-
sential to decrease future generation costs for 
these technologies and to increase the available 
future potential. This means, there will be a 
higher potential available at lower costs in the fu-
ture. Of course, this positive effect is compen-
sated by economic distortions among the RES. 
• Governmental planning and control effort in-
crease with the complexity of the feed-in tariff 
scheme or the diversification of the tender proce-
dure. The gain for society occurring from a more 
specific approach must be compared with these 
premium costs. In addition, the rent seeking and 
lobbying activities increase under such conditions 
compared to a simpler implementation or a TGC 
system. 
                                                          
22 Under the assumption of a ‘perfect’ market, the feed-in tariffs set 
by the public body are higher and thus inefficient from the society’s 
point-of-view compared with a tender scheme. However, a feed-in 
tariff can be the more efficient solution when considering strategic 
bidding, the problems of an oligopoly structure and higher admini-
stration and transaction costs of the tender scheme. 
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Table 5.1 Evaluation of support schemes fulfilling beneficial conditions for RES-E deployment  
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Table 5.2 Evaluation of support schemes fulfilling beneficial conditions for RES-E deployment 
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5.3 Interactions of RES-E support, 
GHG policy, DSM activities 
and promotion of CHP  
On the one hand, the support of RES-E has an im-
pact on the (conventional) power market,) and their 
greenhouse gas abatement and electricity demand 
(policy). Most relevant effects are independent from 
the support mechanism and can be concluded as 
depicted in Table 5.3.  
On the other hand, the other energy policies have an 
effect on RES-E deployment too, which are summa-
rised in Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.3 Impact of RES-E deployment on other conventional power, GHG policy and electricity demand  
and CHP 
Policy Impact         on 
 
of conventional power TEA DSM CHP 
RES-E 
Electricity generation 
drops; 
Power price drops; 
CO2-emissions drops 
lower TEA price; 
CO2-target are easier to 
reach 
lower demand  
reduce costs for DSM 
generation ambiguous 
depending on RES-E 
policy 
 
Table 5.4 Impact of GHG policy, DSM activities and promotion of CHP on RES-E support schemes 
RES-E instrument Impact         on 
 
 
of 
Issue 
TGC FIT / tender 
premium FIT,  
investment incentives, 
tax relief 
 
RES-E deployment 
 
slightly decrease no impact increase 
transfer costs for con-
sumer due to RES-E decrease 
 
no impact 
 
ambiguous  
total transfer costs for 
consumer (TEA plus 
RES-E) 
ambiguous increase increase 
TEA 
 
RES-E target 
 
easier to reach easier to reach (much) easier to reach 
 
RES-E deployment 
 
slightly decrease no impact decrease 
transfer costs for con-
sumer due to RES-E ambiguous 
 
no impact 
 
decrease 
total transfer costs for 
consumer (DSM plus 
RES-E) 
ambiguous increase ambiguous 
DSM 
 
RES-E target 
 
easier to reach easier to reach harder to reach 
RES-E deployment ambiguous no impact / increase 
decrease for pure el. 
plants / ambiguous for 
CHP plants 
transfer costs for con-
sumer due to RES-E ambiguous decrease / no impact 
decrease for pure el. 
plants / ambiguous for 
CHP plants 
total transfer costs for 
consumer (CHP plus 
RES-E) 
ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous 
CHP 
 
RES-E target 
 
ambiguous ambiguous ambiguous 
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6 Results from simulations with the Green-X  
toolbox on EU level 
6.1 Definition of scenarios  
The aim of the scenario runs is to analyse the effects 
of different support schemes – both harmonised and 
non-harmonised policies among the EU 15 Member 
States – with respect to RES-E deployment, invest-
ment needs, generation costs and transfer costs for 
consumers.  
The RES-E Directive (EC/77/01) sets a minimum 
framework for RES-E policy. However, in line with the 
Principle of Subsidiary, it allows each MS to choose 
the support scheme, which “corresponds best to its 
particular situation”. Taking account of the wide di-
versity of promotion schemes between Member 
States, the Directive states that it is too early to set a 
Community-wide framework regarding support 
schemes. By 10/27/2005, the Commission should 
present a report on the experience gained with the 
application and coexistence of different support 
schemes in the Member States. The report may be 
accompanied by a proposal for a Community frame-
work for RES support schemes (art.4.2). However, it 
does not prejudge what the RES-E policy scheme 
should be used for in the future. Not even if a com-
mon RES-E promotion scheme should be imple-
mented. The directive also stipulates that such a pro-
posal for a harmonised support framework should al-
low a transition period of at least 7 years (thereafter) 
in order to maintain investors’ confidence and avoid 
stranded costs. Therefore, at least in the 
short/medium-term, national support schemes will 
continue to be used by MS to promote RES-E. In the 
future – at least - some sort of combination of a 
community framework (harmonisation) and continua-
tion of MS policies for new and existing capacity is 
possible. 
The model runs try to consider the spread of possible 
RES-E policy deployment within the EU in the follow-
ing way:  
• No harmonisation, where currently implemented 
policies remains available (without any adapta-
tion), i.e. business as usual (BAU) forecast 
(scenario B1) 
• After a transition period of 7 years, a har-
monisation of the support schemes takes 
places. To be able to analyse the effect of differ-
ent (harmonised) policies compared to the status 
quo (BAU) it is assumed that the same RES-E 
target as under BAU conditions should be 
reached by 2020. The following currently must 
promising and favourable policies should be in-
vestigated under harmonised conditions:  
– Feed-in tariff (B2) 
– International TGC system (B3) 
– National TGC system (B4) 
• To investigate how the RES-E target influences 
the efficiency of different support schemes, a 
second more ambitious RES-E target should be 
reached in 2020. More precisely, it is assumed 
that 1000 TWh should come from RES-E tech-
nologies in 2020 assuming: 
– Current policy (BAU) up to 2012 - 7 year tran-
sition period - and a harmonised system 
thereafter. Again the goal should be reached 
by applying the following support mecha-
nisms:  
• Feed-in tariff (H1) 
• International TGC system (H2) 
– Harmonisation should already take place in 
2005 and the indicative RES-E target in 2010 
should be reached. Therefore, the effects of 
“early actions” and a high interim target (2010 
goal) can be shown (scenario H3 to H5).  
Figure 6.1 gives an overview of the investigated sce-
nario paths. 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
R
ES
-E
 g
en
er
at
io
n
[%
]
Historical development
BAU-forecast
Indicative EU Target 2010
1000 TWh delay
1000 TWh early action
Transition 
period of
7 years
BAU-policies
TGC system(nat., internat.)
FIT scheme
BAU
target
1000 TWh
target
R
ES
-E
 g
en
er
at
io
n
[%
]
 
Figure 6.1 Investigated cases 
 
6.2 General scenario  
assumptions 
► Gross electricity consumption 
Electricity demand according to DG TREN Out-
look 2030: European Energy and Transport 
Trends to 2030 Outlook (Mantzos et. al 2003) – 
Baseline forecast. This means that electricity 
demand rise – on average – by 1.8% p. a. up to 
2010 and by 1.5 % p. a. thereafter. Of course, on 
country level different demand projections are 
used. For example while the demand forecast for 
 - 15 - 
France is 2.2% p.a. up to 2010, a projection of 
only 1.1% p.a. is assumed for Germany.  
► Primary energy prices for biomass  
products 
Figure 6.2 gives an overview about the variations 
of biomass prices in EU 15 countries. The price 
level differs among the countries and biomass 
fractions. Current prices are based on an as-
sessment conducted within the Green-X project 
and are expressed in €2002. Prices are lowest for 
biowaste, followed by forestry and agricultural 
residues, and they are high for both forestry and 
agricultural products. It is assumed that the costs 
for bioenergy products remain constant till 2010. 
In the period 2010-2015 a slight rise of 0.5% per 
annum and after 2015 a price increase of 1% is 
projected.  
 
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Forestry products
Forestry residues
Agricultural products
Agricultural residues
Biowaste
Fuel price [€/MWh]  
Figure 6.2 Variation of the prices for the dif-
ferent biomass products in EU 15  
 
► Electricity prices 
For each EU 15 Member State the power price is 
derived endogenously within the Green-X model 
considering interconnection constraint among the 
countries. The calculations are based on  
– Primary energy projections from the WETO 
project.  
– Different CO2-policy assumptions
23, namely 
no-CO2 constraint, medium CO2 constraint 
(assuming a tradable emission allowance 
price up to 10 €/t-CO2) and high CO2 con-
straint (assuming a tradable emission allow-
ance price up to 20 €/t-CO2) 
– RES-E policies are as described in chapter 
5.1. Note, RES-E policy significantly influ-
ences the power market price. 
► Interest rate / weighted average cost of 
capital 
The determination of the necessary rate of return 
is based on the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) methodology.24 Two options are consid-
ered in the analysis, namely 6.5% and 8.6%. The 
                                                          
23 In a sensitivity analysis different CO2-contraints are assumed. The 
default assumption refers to a medium CO2-constraint of up to 10 
€/t-CO2. 
24 WACC is often used as an estimate of the internal discount rate 
of a project or the overall rate of return desired by all investors (eq-
uity and debt providers). 
different values are based on different risk as-
sessment, one standard risk level and a higher 
risk level characterised by a higher expected 
market rate of return. The 6.5% value is used as 
the default value; the 8.6% is used for the sensi-
tivity analysis and is applied in scenarios with 
lower stable planning conditions and support 
schemes cause a higher risk for the investors 
(TGC system). To analyse the effects of different 
strategies, for the simulation no technology-
specific risk premiums (different WACC accord-
ing to their maturity and risk characteristics) are 
used.25  
► Future cost projection – technological 
learning 
Within the model Green-X the following dynamic 
developments of the electricity generation tech-
nologies are considered 
– Investment costs (experience curves or expert 
forecast) 
– Operation & Maintenance costs (expert fore-
cast) 
– Improvement of the energy efficiency (expert 
forecast) 
For most technologies the investment cost fore-
cast is based on technological learning, see 
Table 6.1. As learning is taking place on the in-
ternational level the deployment of a technology 
on the global level must be considered. For the 
model runs global deployment consists of the fol-
lowing components:  
– Deployment within the EU 15 Member States 
is endogenously determined, i.e. is derived 
within the model 
– For the new EU Member States (EU-10+) 
forecasts of the future development by  
RES-E categories are taken from the project 
‘FORRES 2020’; for details see Ragwitz et. al. 
(2004). 
– Expected developments in the ‘Rest of the 
world’ are based on forecasts as presented in 
the IEA World Energy Outlook 2004 (IEA, 
2004). 
                                                          
25 For determining the exact setting of the support level such a tech-
nology specific WACC approach is useful. Such a procedure is - in 
a more detailed (country specific) analysis – feasible by applying the 
model Green-X. 
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Table 6.1 Dynamic assessment of investment costs for different RES-E technologies 
RES-E category Applied approach Assumptions 
Biogas Experience curve (global) LR (learning rate) = 5% 
Biomass Experience curve (global) LR = 5% 
Geothermal electricity Experience curve (global) LR = 5% 
Hydropower Expert forecast No cost decrease in considered period 
Photovoltaics Experience curve (global) LR = 15% up to 2010, 10% after 2010 
Solar thermal electricity Experience curve (global) LR = 15% up to 2010, 10% after 2010 
Tidal & Wave Expert forecast Cost decrease 5%/year up to 2010, 1%/year after 2010 
Wind on- & offshore Experience curve (global) LR = 9% 
 
6.3 Assumptions for simulated 
support schemes 
Within this project the two most important support 
schemes within the EU are analysed, namely (i) a 
quota obligation in combination with tradable green 
certificates and (ii) a feed-in tariff system. A number 
of key input parameters are defined for each of the 
model runs and they are described below. 
► General scenario conditions 
Transfer costs for society hugely depend on the 
design of policy instruments. The design options 
of the instruments are chosen in a way such that 
transfer costs for society are low. In the model 
run, it is assumed that all investigated strategies 
– BAU as well as for reaching the 1000 TWh tar-
get by 2020 - are characterised by: 
– Stable planning horizon  
– Continuous RES-E policy / long term RES-E 
targets 
– Clear and well defined tariff structure / yearly 
quota for RES-E technologies  
– Reduced investment and O&M costs, in-
creased energy efficiency over time.  
– Reduction in barriers and high public accep-
tance in the long term26.  
In addition, for all investigated scenarios, with the 
exception of the BAU scenario (i.e. currently im-
plemented policies remain available without ad-
aptations up to 2020) the following design options 
are assumed  
– Financial support is restricted to new capacity 
only 27 
– Restriction of the duration in which investors 
can receive (additional) financial support. 28 
                                                          
26 In the scenario runs it is assumed that the existing social, market 
and technical barriers (.e.g. grid integration) can be overcome in 
time. The reduction depends on the assumed target, i.e. a more op-
timistic view is assumed for reaching the 1000 TWh target in 2020 
compare to the BAU target 
27 This means that only plants constructed after the start year of the 
different scenarios (2004 and 2013 respectively) are allowed to re-
ceive the support. 
► Scenario conditions assuming a quota 
obligation29 
– Tradable green certificates are standardised 
– Full competition, i.e. (i) a high level of market 
transparency exist, (ii) an appropriate level of 
trading volume is available, (iii) investors are 
seeking the most efficient RES-E resources, 
leading to an idealised, fully competitive TGC 
market;30  
– Additional support for less mature RES-E 
technologies does not exist 
– Constant yearly interim targets31 
– Penalty for not fulfilling the quota obligation 
are set high amounts up to 150 €/MWh.  
► Scenario conditions assuming a feed-in 
tariff scheme32 
– Guaranteed tariffs are technology specific,  
– Tariffs are set as low as is reasonable without 
causing a lower deployment rate over the 
RES-E portfolio.  
– Guaranteed tariffs decrease over time or at 
least remain constant for certain RES-E tech-
nologies 
– Tariffs for wind energy are designed as a 
stepped feed-in tariff 33 
 
                                                                                      
28 In the model runs it is assumed that the time frame is restricted to 
15 years 
29 With the exception of the quota obligation given in the current 
RES-E policies (BAU scenario) 
30 Otherwise costs rise due to strategic price setting. 
31 Interim targets are set in a way that the percentage increase be-
tween the single years is constant in the period 2013-2020 (for the 
case of a harmonised strategy beyond 2012) and in the period 
2006-2010 and 2011-2020 (for the case that the indicative target in 
2010 should be reached) 
32 With the exception of the feed-in tariffs schemes given in the cur-
rent RES-E policies (BAU scenario) 
33 This means that the feed-in tariff will be reduced if actual genera-
tion is high. To set an incentive for investors to implement the most 
efficient technologies and locations, the reduction in the guaranteed 
price must be less than the total revenue that can be gained if an ef-
ficient plant and location are chosen. Profits will thus be higher at 
more cost effective sites. A stepped tariff e.g. is implemented in 
Germany 
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6.4 Results - BAU target in 2020 
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Figure 6.3 Development of RES-E generation 2004-2020 within EU 15  
in the BAU scenario (B1) 
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Figure 6.4 Portfolio of RES-E technology on RES-E generation in 2020  
among the Member States under BAU conditions (B1) 
 
Total amount of RES-E generation within the EU 15 
was around 449 TWh/a in 2004.34 Without any 
changes in the support scheme the electricity pro-
duction will rise to about 581 TWh/a in 2010 (19,0%) 
and 848 TWh/a in 2020 (24,3%). This amount is - 
following the BAU demand projection from Mantzos 
et. al. (2003a) – around 93 TWh/a or 2% less than 
the EU target as described in the ‘RES-E Directive’ 
(01/77/EC).35 Remaining the current policy schemes, 
the EU target 2010 can be reached with a delay of 
around 3 years (efficiency demand according to 
Mantzos et. al (2003)) and 5 years (BAU demand 
according to Mantzos et. al (2003)),  
respectively.  
                                                          
34 Note: RES-E generation in 2004 refers to available potential of 
RES-E times normal (average) full load hours of the technologies. 
This means actual generation can differ from this value due to (i) 
variation of generation from average conditions (e.g. for hydro-
power or wind) and (ii) new capacity build in 2004 is not fully avail-
able for the whole period 2004.  
35 Assuming an electricity demand projected according to the effi-
ciency scenario (Mantzos et. al., 2003b), the share of RES-E 
amounts 20% in 2010 and 26,9% in 2020.  
The dynamic development of RES-E generation for 
the BAU case is depicted in Figure 6.3. On country 
level large differences in the future RES-E deploy-
ment exists. Three countries would reach the indica-
tive RES-E targets without any adaptation of their 
current strategy in 2010; namely Germany, the 
Netherlands and UK (assuming a binding penalty). 
Substantial additional RES-E development can be 
expected in most countries after 2010.  
Due to less public support and acceptance, the 
amount of large scale hydro power plants will in-
crease only marginally in absolute terms.36 In rela-
tive terms the share drops significantly from around 
60% in 2004 to 33% in 2020. The ‘winner’ among 
the considered technologies is wind energy, both 
onshore and offshore. It can be expected that 
around 45% (30%) of the RES-E production of 
plants installed after 2004 in 2020 is coming from 
wind onshore (offshore), leading to a share of 
                                                          
36 Considering the effects of the Water Framework directive (EC, 
2000b) the total electricity generation from (large scale) hydro can 
even be lower in 2020 compared to the current level.  
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around 30% wind onshore and 15% wind offshore on 
total RES-E generation in 2020, respectively. Other 
significant increases can be expected for solid bio-
mass (+ 8%) and biogas (+ 6%). The portfolio of 
RES-E technologies significantly differs among the 
Member States as can be seen from Figure 6.4. 
It can be expected that the highest amount of ‘new’ 
RES-E will be produced in the UK and Germany fol-
lowing by France, Spain and Italy. In general, actual 
generation depends on the applied policy and partly 
varies significantly.  
High investments are necessary to be able to build 
up the new capacity. Figure 6.5 shows the total in-
vestment needs for RES-E over time assuming BAU 
policy up to 2020. While necessary investments into 
wind onshore and biogas plants are relative stable 
over time, investments into solid biomass plants (in-
cluding biowaste) mainly occur in the first years 
(2005-2015) and for wind offshore and photovoltaic 
mainly after 2010. The investments (within the EU 
and worldwide) stimulate technological learning, 
leading to lower generation costs in the future. 
Next, the necessary financial incentive for the pro-
motion of RES-E is discussed. Figure 6.6 compares 
the average financial support for new RES-E  
capacity for the four investigated cases B1 to B4. 
The amount represents the additional premium costs 
for society compared to the power market price.37  
With respect to the BAU policy 
(B1) it can be conclude that the 
average premium costs remains 
constant up to 2012 and decreases 
thereafter. The reduction, however, 
is lower than introducing a harmo-
nised well designed technology 
specific feed-in tariff scheme (B2). 
Again, the necessary support 
nearly drops continuously over 
time.38 In contrast to this scheme 
the entity of both a national and in-
ternational TGC system is to pro-
mote currently least cost genera-
tion options (only).39 Hence, in the 
first year(s) premium costs are low 
but increase over time as cheap 
production options are already 
used.40  
                                                          
37 Note: At this stage a power price reduction due to the promotion 
of RES-E is neglected. Hence, premium costs are (slightly) overes-
timated. 
38 Note: The incentive compatible feed-in tariff is designed that the 
necessary amount dynamically drops. The slight increase in 2014 
results as a higher share of more expensive technologies is ex-
ploited.  
39 By using technology-cluster specific quotas or granting additional 
support for less mature technologies a different dynamic support 
development can be reached 
40 The development of the premium costs depends on the mid term 
target, the available potential and the cost reduction due to techno-
logical learning. This means the necessary support can increase or 
decrease over time.  
It can be observed that premium costs for society 
are higher applying a national TGC scheme com-
pared to an international one. In addition, consider-
ing the higher risk associated with a TGC scheme 
for the investors the necessary support is higher 
than applying a technology specific well designed 
feed-in system.41  
The application of current policies leads to a high 
spread of the granted financial premium costs 
among the countries as depicted in Figure 6.7a.  
The necessary premium support per MWh new 
RES-E generation can be mainly harmonised be-
tween the countries by applying harmonised feed-in 
tariff schemes, see Figure 6.7b, or fully by applying 
an international TGC scheme, see Figure 6.7c.42 In 
contrast to this two schemes national TGC systems 
do not (automatically) lead to similar or the same fi-
nancial incentives for new RES-E production in all 
countries as illustrated in Figure 6.7d.43 The pre-
mium depends on the national RES-E target setting. 
Assuming that the same national RES-E deployment 
as under the BAU policy should be reached, high 
distortions between the countries occur.44  
Summing up, it can be concluded that the applica-
tion of a harmonised approach leads to a uniform 
support per MWh of RES-E technologies in the 
countries. This means that distortions of the techno-
logical development of each RES-E technology 
among the Member States can be avoided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Total investment needs in the period 
2005-2020 within the EU-15 in the 
BAU scenario (B1)  
                                                          
41 For comparison purpose, the ‘necessary’ premium for the case of 
no risk premium is depicted in Figure 6.6 too (dotted lines). 
42 The remaining differences occur due to the different technology 
mix. In the case that for each technology the same tariff level – 
which of course is inefficient with respect to the costs for society – 
is grated the premium support would be equal in each countries 
too.  
43 Note: Harmonisation in the case of a feed-in scheme means that 
the same tariffs for the different technologies are granted. As the 
RES-E portfolio, however, differs within the countries (slightly) 
variations in the average support occur.  
44 This fact confirms the existence of large variations in the current 
RES-E support. 
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B4b: BAU (2005-2012), national TGC scheme (2013-2020) - no risk premium
B4a: BAU (2005-2012), national TGC scheme (2013-2020) - risk premium
B3b: BAU (2005-2012), international TGC scheme (2013-2020) - no risk premium
B3a: BAU (2005-2012), international TGC scheme (2013-2020) - risk premium
B2: BAU (2005-2012), harm. FIT scheme (2013-2020)
B1: BAU policy (2005-2020)
 
Figure 6.6 Comparison of financial support (average premium to power price) for new 
 RES-E generation on EU 15 level in the period 2005-2020 for the cases (B1-B4) 
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(a) current RES-E policy schemes (case B1) 
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(c) international TGC scheme after 2012 (case B3)
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(b) internationally harmonised feed-in tariff scheme  
after 2012 (case B2) 
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(d) national TGC schemes after 2012 (case B4)
Figure 6.7 Country specific financial support (average premium to power price) 
 for new RES-E generation in the period 2005-2020 for the cases (B1-B4): 
 (a) applying current RES-E policy schemes (B1) … (top-left) 
(b) applying an internationally harmonised feed-in tariff scheme after 2012 (B2) … (bottom-left) 
 (c) applying an international TGC scheme after 2012 (B3) … (top-right) 
 (d) applying national TGC schemes after 2012 (B4) … (bottom-right) 
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Figure 6.8 Comparison of necessary transfer costs for consumer reaching the BAU target 2020  
for the cases (B1–B4) 
 
The yearly necessary transfer costs for consumer on 
EU level reaching the BAU target over time are de-
picted for the four investigated cases in Figure 6.8. 
The yearly burden is highest remaining the current 
policy schemes. In this case transfer costs for soci-
ety rise continuously over time. Costs are relative 
stable applying a technology specific feed-in tariff 
from 2013 on. In the case of a TGC scheme burden 
in the first years drop compared to the 2012 level, 
but increases over time  
Harmonisation reduces the distortion with respect to 
the required transfer costs for the societies in the 
countries. The same promotion of one unit of new 
RES-E for each technology in the different Member 
States (harmonisation of the schemes), however, 
does not automatically results in a uniform burden 
for the consumer per MWh electricity consumption.45  
In the case of a feed-in tariff or tender scheme the 
transfer costs (premium costs) for society depends 
on the actual national RES-E deployment. This 
means that the burden for the consumer is high in 
countries with a relative high potential as a high total 
electricity generation from RES-E occur. In addition, 
the costs rise if the share of relative ‘expensive’ 
RES-E technologies is high too. In the case of an in-
ternational TGC scheme the burden depends on the 
agreed national RES-E target, i.e. the costs are in-
dependent from the actual national RES-E produc-
tion; the different to the quota level can be sold at or 
must be purchased from the international TGC mar-
ket.46 Applying a national TGC scheme the transfer 
costs for consumer depends on the agreed TGC 
target too, however, without the opportunity to use 
all efficient RES-E generation options if the target 
setting among the countries is inappropriate. 
                                                          
45 One approach how to harmonise the burden for the consumer 
among the countries is discussed in chapter 7.2.6. 
46 In this investigation it is assumed that each country is imposed 
by the same RES-E target for new plants. This means that the bur-
den for RES-E policy after 2012 is equal among the consumer in 
the Member States (uniform quota for new RES-E generation). 
In addition, the yearly transfer costs for consumer 
depend on the historical promotion of RES-E. These 
costs are independent from the actual RES-E policy 
as it is assumed that existing capacity remains in 
their old promotion scheme – the new schemes are 
applied to new capacity only.  
Note that the yearly transfer costs represent the ac-
tually yearly imposed costs for society and are not 
fully comparable among each other with respect to 
the total burden for the consumer47. For example in 
the case of the BAU scenario some countries are 
granting investment incentives, leading to a high 
yearly costs for the new RES-E capacity but lower 
costs in the years thereafter. As the time horizon 
ends by 2020 in the Figure 6.8 the total burden for 
the consumer seams to be ‘too high’ in the BAU 
scenario compared to the other cases as a higher 
share of the costs are already paid up to 2020.48 The 
yearly burden can be influenced by changing the 
guaranteed duration of the support. For example the 
yearly amount increases by guaranteeing a tariff for 
10 years instead of 15 years. In this case, however, 
premium costs must be paid only 10 years so total 
burden remains approximately constant.  
A comparison of the full transfer costs for the con-
sumer is given in Figure 6.9. Total transfer costs for 
society after 2020 (dotted area) are higher under a 
TGC scheme than under a feed-in system as the 
TGC price is high in 2020. Total transfer costs for 
society are lowest applying technology specific sup-
port, followed by an international and a national TGC 
scheme and are highest retaining the current policy 
up to 2020. 
                                                          
47 However, they are fully comparable regarding the yearly burden 
for the consumer. 
48 For the harmonised cases a guaranteed duration of 15 years is 
assumed. This means that a capacity, which is built in 2019 will re-
ceive a public support up to 2034. In Figure 6.8, however, only the 
costs for the years 2019 and 2020 are depicted, neglecting the full 
‘sunk costs’ up to 2034 in the period after 2020.  
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Figure 6.9 Comparison of necessary cumulated total transfer costs for consumer 
 due to RES-E policy up to 2020 reaching the BAU target 2020 (B1 – B4).  
Note: In the case of a TGC scheme total transfer costs paid after 2020 are estimated 
 assuming that the TGC price in the year 2020 is constant up to the phase out of the support 
 
 
6.5 Results - 1.000 TWh target 
in 2020 
To analyse how the RES-E target influences the 
RES-E portfolio and the efficiency of different  
support schemes, model runs are carried out fulfill-
ing a more ambitious RES-E target. Figure 6.10 de-
picts the deployment of RES-E generation reaching 
1000 TWh in 2020 over time. 
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Figure 6.10 Development of RES-E generation 2004-2020 within EU-15 
 in the 1000 TWh scenario (case H3) 
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Figure 6.11 Portfolio of RES-E technology on RES-E generation in 2020 
 among the Member States in the 1000 TWh scenario (variant H3) 
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Figure 6.12 Comparison of financial support (average premium to power price) for new  
RES-E generation on EU 15 level in the period 2005-2020 for the cases (H1-H5) 
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Figure 6.13 Comparison of necessary transfer costs for consumer reaching the 1000 TWh target 
in 2020 starting 2005 and 2013 with a harmonised approach (H1–H5) 
 
The portfolio reaching the 1000 TWh differs partly 
significantly compared to fulfilling the lower BAU tar-
get, i.e. 848 TWh by 2020. For example the share of 
wind onshore on the new RES-E generation 2005-
2020 drops from around 45% to 36% as less addi-
tional potential is available contributing to a higher 
RES-E target. The share of wind offshore decreases 
too; but to a much lower extent. In contrast, electric-
ity generation from (solid) biomass increases dra-
matically, from around 9% to 17%. With respect to 
the total RES-E production the portfolio is more ho-
mogenously distributed among the RES-E technolo-
gies, i.e. a higher spread of RES-E technologies is 
necessary fulfilling the ambitious target. The country 
specific portfolio (for the case of international trade) 
is depicted in Figure 6.11. The highest additional 
RES-E generation compared to reaching the BAU 
target is coming from in Germany, France, Spain, It-
aly, Sweden, Finland, Denmark und Ireland.  
Investment needs can be estimated with around 
14.000 to 16.000 M€/a. Similar to the BAU cases, 
investments for biomass mainly take place in the first 
decade. In the later phase investments needs in-
crease for wind offshore, tide & wave as well as bio-
gas. 
Figure 6.12 shows the necessary financial support 
for all investigated 1000 TWh scenarios. Assuming a 
harmonised approach after 2012 (H1 and H2) a simi-
lar picture as for the BAU cases can be observed: 
namely that the necessary support in the case of a 
feed-in tariff scheme decreases and for a TGC 
scheme increases over time.49 The effects of a har-
monised strategy starting already in 2005 (H3 to H5) 
can be summarised as follows. Under this assump-
tion different grant level are needed. In all cases – 
feed-in tariff, international and national TGC scheme 
– the support (slightly) drops over time. The amount, 
however, differs significantly. Costs in the case of a 
                                                          
49 Despite using efficient mechanism, costs are higher for the 1000 
TWh target in 2020 compared remaining the current strategies in 
place and reaching 848 TWh by 2020. 
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national TGC scheme are extreme high. The reason 
is that some countries are unable to reach their in-
dicative RES-E in 2010. Hence, the national TGC 
price corresponds with their penalty price, which is 
assumed to be high (200 €/MWh).50,51  
The yearly transfer costs for society for all investi-
gated 1000 TWh cases are depicted in Figure 6.13. 
The effects with respect to the yearly transfer pay-
ments for the consumer / society correspond well 
with the development of the financial support curves 
per MWh of new RES-E generation. For the case 
that harmonisation should be taken place after a 
transition period of 7 years the following main effects 
can be observed: Yearly transfer costs are higher in 
the early phase applying a feed-in tariff scheme 
compared to an international TGC scheme as, firstly, 
the tariff is designed in a way that it drops over time 
and, secondly, a higher deployment occur in this 
(early) period.  
                                                          
50 Assuming a low penalty the incentive to fulfil the RES-E quota is 
low. Under this assumption investments will be postponed, i.e. 
higher costs occur later. 
51 To investigate the effect of reaching a high interim target (RES-E 
target 2010), model runs has been carried out assuming that this 
target must not be reached. It can be observed that in both cases – 
feed-in tariff and international TGC scheme - the necessary support 
is lower in the first years, however with a more moderate reduction 
over time. 
Assuming a full harmonisation in 2005 the following 
conclusion can be drawn: Transfer costs within a 
TGC scheme are (much) higher if the target (quota) 
is very ambitious (high interim target 2010 target) 
and with advanced RES-E deployment, i.e. from 
2018 onward.52  
With respect to the total costs for society – see 
Figure 6.14 - it can be clearly conclude that technol-
ogy specific support mechanisms are preferable 
compared to schemes, which do not consider a 
technology specific support to fulfil an ambitious 
RES-E target in the future. In all investigated cases 
the necessary average financial support is lower ap-
plying a well designed technology specific feed-in 
tariff system compared to a non technology specific 
TGC scheme or TGC scheme which allows an addi-
tional promotion of less mature technologies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14 Comparison of total transfer costs for 
consumer due to RES-E policy up to 
2020 reaching the 1000 TWh target 
 in 2020 (H1–H5).  
Note: In the case of a TGC scheme total 
transfer costs paid after 2020 are  
estimated assuming that the TGC price 
 in the year 2020 is constant up to the 
phase out of the support 
 
                                                          
52 Note: Due to the high support level also less mature technologies 
will be stimulated. Therefore, in the later phase (after 2020) TGC 
price may be drop again.  
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6.6 Effects of RES-E deployment 
on conventional power price 
and CO2 emissions 
Finally, the effects of RES-E deployment should be 
analysed in brief. Figure 6.15 gives an impression of 
the impact of RES-E deployment on the wholesale 
electricity price. A price reduction of 5% (BAU target) 
to 10% (1000 TWh target) can be observed com-
pared to the case of no additional promotion of RES-
E in the future.53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15 Comparison of wholesale electricity 
price including RES-E premium  
compared to reference development  
(no RES-E policy and TEA price of 
10€/t-CO2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16 Comparison of CO2-emissions com-
pared to reference development  
(no RES-E policy and TEA price of 
10€/t-CO2)  
                                                          
53 More precisely, it is assumption that (i) no RES-E policy exist in 
the future, and (iii), a market price for tradable emissions allow-
ances of 10 €/t-CO2, 
This means that – neglecting possible back-up costs 
for RES-E – deployment of RES-E leads to a price 
reduction on the power market of 5% to 10%. 54 To-
tal additional costs (burden) due to the promotion of 
RES-E by considering the additional transfer costs 
for consumer are in the magnitude of 3% (5%) for a 
feed-in tariff schemes and reaching the BAU target 
(1000 TWh target) up to 15% in 2020 in case of a 
TGC scheme for the 1000 TWh target.  
Due to an additional price of 3% - 15%, however, 
CO2-emissions from thermal power plants can be 
reduced by 20% to 25% - see Figure 6.16.  
                                                          
54 Or expressed the other way round: The backup costs for RES-E 
by implementing the same conventional power structure as without 
RES-E development would result in additional costs of 5% to 10% 
(2-4 €/MWh).  
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7 Recommended actions and final conclusions 
7.1 Overcoming existing barriers 
The future penetration of a RES-E technology de-
pends on how it prevails over two categories of ex-
isting obstacles: 
• Economic barriers – they are reflected by the net 
generation costs, i.e. inclusion of policy strate-
gies. 
• Non-economic barriers (mostly social, adminis-
trative, market and technical obstacles), – they 
restrict the available potential of electricity gen-
eration for the current year(s). 
 
Overcome of 
economic barriers
Overcome of non-
economic barriers
Used potential
Economic level
LTMC
Available Potential year n
[GWh/year]
price, costs 
[€/MWh]
 
Figure 7.1 Necessary conditions reaching a 
RES-E deployment 
 
Penetration of a technology will only take place if 
both categories of barriers can be overcome. So, on 
the one hand, it does not help to support a certain 
technology via a quota obligation, a guaranteed 
feed-in tariff or a tender scheme without preparing 
the framework conditions to overcome the other ex-
isting barriers, e.g. increasing the social acceptance 
using information campaigns, or decreasing adminis-
trative burdens for commissioning new plants, etc. In 
other words, low (net) generation costs but a low ex-
isting potential still results in less additional penetra-
tion.  
On the other hand, providing a good environment at 
administrative, social, industrial and technical levels 
(i.e. admitting a huge potential) without economic in-
centives does not increase the future penetration 
rate of a certain technology. A high potential for elec-
tricity generation but high generation costs also re-
sults in a low market share.  
 
7.1.1 Overcoming of economic barriers 
• Independent of the type of instrument applied to 
support renewables, the careful design of the 
strategy is as important as the question which 
policy tool to implement, e.g.  
– Within any support mechanisms existing ca-
pacities and new capacities should be distin-
guished. Support should no longer be pro-
vided to plants that are fully depreciated or 
that were financially supported in the past; 
– The support mechanism of any instrument 
should be restricted to a certain time frame. 
The duration should depend on the policy 
scheme (e.g. development of the TGC price) 
and on the maximum annual additional costs 
that can be imposed on society. In addition, 
the support time should also depend on the 
evolution of the costs of the RES-E technol-
ogy (i.e., progress along the learning curve). 
• The RES-E support structure should also be di-
rected towards supporting small-scale projects, 
as these small-scale projects - with a relatively 
short lead-time - could be an important part of 
the solution to the capacity shortage in electricity 
supply. 
• The effectiveness of various RES-E support 
schemes largely depends on the credibility of the 
system. A stable planning with long term targets 
and guaranteed support is important to create a 
sound investment climate and to lower social 
costs as a result of a lower risk premium.  
• Change of subsidy policy. The social and envi-
ronmental costs of pollution are not internalised 
in current electricity prices of conventional power 
(within the TEA system CO2 costs are partly in-
ternalised). If this kind of policy is changed, RES-
E will be even more competitive 
 
7.1.2 Overcoming non-economic  
barriers 
Existing barriers for new RES-E generators should 
be removed rigorously and outstanding incentives 
should be provided: 
► Policy / Social barriers:  
– Start / continue information campaigns  
– Distortions resulting from unequal tax bur-
dens and existing subsidies, and the failure 
to internalise all costs and benefits of con-
ventional energy production and use, create 
high barriers to renewable energy.  
– Integration and coordination of other policies 
like climate change, agricultural policy or 
DSM issues helps to reduce administration 
barriers 
– Increasing the use of renewable energies 
should obviously be accompanied by end-use 
energy efficiency and demand side manage-
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ment measures. Renewable energy devel-
opment and increase of energy efficiency are 
strongly interdependent.55  
► Technical barriers:  
– Reduce system operation costs: Some  
RES-E sources like wind energy or photovol-
taics are often penalised due to the intermit-
tency of their electricity generation. This 
means that additional costs are a direct bur-
den on electricity generation in the form of 
additional system operation costs comprising 
system capacity and balancing costs.56 
Remedies to significantly mitigate system 
operation costs are: 57  
• to improve forecast tools for wind energy 
• to re-design the market focusing on flexi-
ble loads on the demand side 
– Correctly allocate grid extension costs: An 
upgrade or extension of the grid will be nec-
essary in the future due to both new genera-
tion capacity and increasing demand, leading 
to additional costs for the system: 
• Full unbundling: Within a liberalised mar-
ket full unbundling between generation, 
transmission / distribution and customer 
supply should take place. This means that 
grid upgrade / extension requirements, 
measures and corresponding costs have 
to be allocated to the regulated ‘natural 
monopoly’, the grid operator58; 
• Imposing the true costs for transmission 
and distribution from generation to con-
sumption (zonal price): The correct price 
signal, reflecting actual transmission and 
distribution costs will lead to an increase or 
decrease of the total generation costs. 
Transmission costs are lower for genera-
tors who are located closer to large con-
sumers or who feed their electricity into the 
grid at a lower power level. Therefore, 
some RES-E technologies (e.g. photovol-
                                                          
55 The European Union has always stressed the pressing need to 
renew commitment both at Community and Member State level to 
promote energy efficiency more actively. In the light of the Kyoto 
agreement to reduce CO2 emissions, improved energy efficiency 
together with increased use of renewables will play a key role in 
meeting the EU Kyoto target economically. In addition to a signifi-
cant positive environmental impact, improved energy efficiency will 
lead to a more sustainable development and enhanced security of 
supply, as well as to many other benefits. 
56 According to Auer (2004) additional system operation costs are 
composed of 1/3 additional balancing costs and 2/3 additional ca-
pacity costs. For a wind penetration (share of installed wind capac-
ity to peak load) of less than 10% system operation costs are esti-
mated at 2-4 €/MWh and for a share greater than 10% at 5-6 
€/MWh.  
57 Note that in general fluctuations and forecast errors of both sup-
ply and demand exist, i.e. supply and demand do not correlate  
58 In the case of centralised conventional power, the grid extension 
costs have, in the past, not been directly imposed on generation 
costs.  
taics) would profit from a zonal pricing ap-
proach. Other technologies like e.g. wind, 
however, would be suffered from such a 
price model. 59 
► Administration barriers:  
Due to long and complex permission procedures 
a long lead time in RES-E generation occurs, in-
creasing the pressure and the costs to achieve 
agreed RES-E targets and / or may reduce the 
ambitiousness of RES-E targets in the future. 
► Market barriers:  
In many countries a lot of market barriers exist, 
which have to be overcome: 
– Electricity utilities maintain monopoly rights to 
produce, transmit and distribute electricity. 
High costs or the absence of standards for 
connection and transmission discourage re-
newable energy projects; 
– Lack of information about available RES-E 
generation and about the current state of RE 
technologies, or negative past experiences 
with old technologies, and a lack of under-
standing about the benefits associated with 
renewable energy all act as barriers to their 
use; 
– To a certain extent manufacturing structures 
are insufficiently developed, unable to use 
economies of scale in production. Due to the 
formation of technology clusters efficiency 
improvements can be excepted; 
– Lack of access to affordable credit exists due 
firstly to the information asymmetry of finan-
cial institutions with respect to RES-E tech-
nologies and, secondly, higher risk due to the 
uncertainty of promotion schemes in many 
countries; 
► Research and development:  
Research, technological development and inno-
vation will remain major drivers for RES-E de-
ployment in the coming decades. Even tech-
nologies close to maturity like wind energy will 
see further improvements and completely new 
concepts enter the markets. Aspects related to 
the systems technology for RES-E integration 
into existing energy infrastructures will receive 
more emphasis. Clear and comprehensive R&D 
activities help to reach this goal. The generation 
of new skills in new potential RE industries is 
necessary. 
 
  
                                                          
59 Everywhere in EU, wind is suffering from weak grid connections. 
The government can enhance the use of offshore wind significantly 
if grid connections are provided in time (e.g. for UK, Netherlands) 
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Should RES-E
technologies be
promoted on a 
broad scale?
How ambitious is the
RES-E target in the
mid to long term?
Who should
benefit most from
the system?
Should a competitive
system be set up?
How should the 
premium costs / burden
for consumers 
be distributed 
over time?
How does international 
burden sharing for 
consumers look like?
Should the system be 
implemented at a 
national or 
international level?
POLICY 
OBJECTIVE
 
Figure 7.2 Possible policy objectives in choosing the appropriate support scheme 
 
7.2 Which instrument fits best? 
To answer the question which instrument fits best, it 
is necessary to identify the core policy objective be-
hind the support of RES-E technologies. At a mini-
mum, the following aspects should be considered in 
selecting the appropriate support mechanism, see 
Figure 7.2. 
 
7.2.1 Should only some RES-E  
technologies be promoted or is it 
important to give all technologies 
a chance for development? 
A technology specific support scheme has advan-
tages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it may 
lead to a higher deployment rate as currently less 
mature technologies get a stimulus now and are 
available to a larger extent in the future. In addition, 
a diversification may reduce the costs for consumer 
compared with uniform non technology specific sup-
port, especially if the RES-E deployment is sup-
posed to be ambitious. On the other hand, higher 
administration costs may occur. Furthermore, total 
system generation costs are higher - at least in the 
early phase.60 
To optimise the level of technology diversification, it 
is necessary to counteract all negative effects 
(higher administration costs, reduced competition) 
with occurring benefits (lower costs for consumers, 
higher possible RES-E targets).  
The ability to split the support depends on the policy 
instrument, i.e. the ability to provide technology spe-
cific support depends on the kind of RES-E instru-
ment:  
                                                          
60 The generation costs in the later phase can be both, lower or 
higher, depending on the technological diffusion and available po-
tential of the currently less mature but supported RES-E technolo-
gies. 
► Feed-in tariff scheme 
A differentiation can be implemented most easily 
within a feed-in tariff scheme. Fewer problems 
occur applying such a scheme; 
► Tender procedure 
A technology split within tender scheme is feasi-
ble. Of course it is important to bear in mind that, 
on the one hand, too little diversification facili-
tates strategic bidding, and, on the other hand, 
too large split jeopardises competition due to the 
development of an oligopoly structure;  
► Quota obligation 
Implementing technology specific quotas is more 
critical, as too much diversification (significantly) 
reduces the advantage of a trading scheme. The 
setting of technology specific (linear) interim tar-
gets is difficult, especially if market size is low. 
The reason is that the available potential de-
pends on technological diffusion in the past and 
varies dynamically over time. On international 
level (big markets) a certain technology is avail-
able on different degrees of maturity in the single 
countries. Hence, the yearly available potential is 
more stable than in a small market over time; 
while the potential drops in countries where most 
of the available potential is already used, a 
higher share is available in countries with a lower 
exploited potential.  
One alternative to creating different markets 
(sub-targets), at least at the national level, is to 
combine a quota obligation with investment sub-
sidies, tax relief or tender scheme based on in-
vestment subsidies. These options avoid the is-
sue that the available potential for each sub-
quota (target) must be known and that large 
number of sub-markets jeopardises the liquidity 
and the transparency of the market. However, 
problems with respect to such an alternative ap-
proach occur when implementing the TGC sys-
tem at the international level. As the TGC price 
is set at the international level, but the additional 
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support at the national level, strategic policy re-
actions are feasible: Countries providing less 
additional support gain from the (cheap) interna-
tional TGC price without contributing to it to an 
adequate extent, i.e. without financing the sys-
tem via national support. 
On the one hand, if costs for currently most cost effi-
cient technologies should be brought down (to com-
petitive market prices) a TGC system is optimal. Of 
course, such a strategy can be problematic for RES-
E development in the future as there is insufficient 
stimulus for the development of currently less ma-
ture technologies. On the other hand, if it is an ob-
jective to reduce generation costs of currently less 
mature technologies – in general, the cost reduction 
potential is huge due to high progress in technologi-
cal learning – a technology specific support scheme 
fits well. Such a scheme can be easily implemented 
by a feed-in tariff or (to a certain extent) a tender 
scheme, leading to a more harmonised RES-E de-
ployment in the mid- to long-term. 
 
7.2.2 How ambitious is the RES-E tar-
get in the mid-to long-term?  
How fast should the growth of 
RES-E deployment be? 
An ambitious RES-E deployment can only be 
reached by a simultaneous promotion of different 
RES-E technologies. This proposition is explained in 
Figure 7.3. It is assumed that two technologies A 
and B exist and that the marginal generation costs 
for technology A are lower than for technology B. 
Further assume – as can be observed in reality and 
implemented in the model Green-X – that the devel-
opment of a technology follows a typical S-curve.  
In the case that both technologies are simultane-
ously promoted, the diffusion process starts at the 
same time. The total RES-E deployment from tech-
nologies A+B increases as technology A and tech-
nology B are developed, i.e. a simultaneous support 
leads to high deployment, see the upper graph in 
Figure 7.3.  
Under the assumption that the promotion of RES-E 
technologies takes place according to their respec-
tive economic generation costs a quite different 
situation occurs. In the illustrative example technol-
ogy A is promoted first, i.e. a deployment of technol-
ogy A but no development of technology B takes 
place in the early phase. Over time, if most of the 
(cheap) potential for technology A is used technol-
ogy B is applied too. Hence, the total deployment of 
technology A+B requires a longer time period than 
under a simultaneous stimulus, see lower graph in 
Figure 7.3.  
As long as the required RES-E target is less ambi-
tious – more precisely, lower than the blue sum 
curve of technology A+B on the lower graph in 
Figure 7.3 – the sequence of the RES-E promotion 
does not influence RES-E deployment. In the case 
of a more ambitious RES-E target, a simultaneous 
stimulus is necessary.  
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Figure 7.3 Effect of a simultaneous promotion of 
RES-E technologies versus a serial 
promotion (according to the cost effi-
ciency) with respect to total RES-E 
deployment 
 
7.2.3 Who should benefit from the  
system – RES-E industry,  
consumer, producer, etc? 
One of the highest barriers in finding a joint agree-
ment is that the benefit for different (interest) groups 
depends on the support mechanism as well as on its 
design.  
• For RES-E manufacturers the continuity of the 
RES-E policy is most important. This means, the 
design of the instrument – guaranteeing a con-
tinuous demand for RES-E technologies – is 
more important than the kind of policy instru-
ment. Of course, manufacturers of less mature 
RES-E options gain from the promotion of less 
cost efficient technologies which can be imple-
mented most efficiently via a technology specific 
feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme or a tender system;61 
                                                          
61 This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that manufac-
turers of currently cost efficient technologies prefer strategies that 
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• Investors in cheap RES-E generation options 
prefer a TGC system as windfall profits are 
higher under a scheme of uniform incentives for 
all technologies;  
• The benefits for investors in more costly genera-
tion options (but still low enough to participate in 
the system) depend on investor preferences. If 
they are more risk-loving they prefer a TGC sys-
tem and under the assumption that they are risk 
averse they prefer a FIT scheme (provided that 
the tariff is guaranteed for a longer period) guar-
anteeing a minimum rent;  
• Consumers benefit most if their transfer costs for 
the promotion of RES-E are low62. In most cases 
and considered over a certain time frame, a 
feed-in tariff scheme63 or tender procedure fulfils 
these requirements better than a uniform TGC 
system without any additional support. Of 
course, if additional support mechanisms like in-
vestment subsidies - both via fixed prices or ten-
der procedures – or tax relief assist a TGC 
scheme transfer costs for consumer can also be 
reduced; 
• Where the core objective is to minimise genera-
tion costs, a TGC system implemented at an in-
ternational level is most appropriate, at least in 
the early phase of RES-E deployment. Note, in 
contrast to general economic theory, in the long 
term higher generation costs can occur if only 
the most cost efficient technologies are pro-
moted. The reason is that the potential of less 
mature technologies, which must be used in the 
future if the long-term target is to be reached, is 
not available in the necessary magnitude. 
Hence, also (more) expensive technology op-
tions must be used simultaneously64. 
 
7.2.4 Should a competitive system be 
set up? 
It must initially be clarified where competition should 
take place  
► Should competition be fostered among 
manufacturers? 
Competition among manufacturers is mainly in-
dependent of the support mechanism. A com-
petitive market can be achieved by overcoming 
                                                                                     
promote only cost efficient technologies. The reason is that under 
such conditions the danger of overheated markets exists.  
62 Note that consumers (voters) are the driving force behind politics 
and, hence, low public acceptance can overturn long-term RES-E 
policies.  
63 A necessary precondition for an efficient feed-in scheme is that 
the tariffs are technology specific. In addition, costs for consumers 
can be reduced further if (i) tariffs decreases over time and (ii) a 
stepped design is applied.  
64 The difference with other markets is that the demand is exoge-
nously (artificially) given by policy and not by the market itself.  
existing market barriers, improving transparency 
and, most importantly, offering long-term devel-
opment perspectives for the RES-E technology. 
The quality of the RES-E technology is influ-
enced by the support scheme. When applying a 
TGC system or a tender scheme, manufacturers 
are encouraged to produce most cost efficient 
components. In contrast, a feed-in tariff scheme 
- under the assumption that the tariff is guaran-
teed long enough - facilitates the implementation 
of high quality components, as the objective of 
the investor is not only the minimisation of gen-
eration costs, but, rather, the maximisation of 
revenues gained from the tariff over the entire 
period. 
► Should competition be enforced be-
tween generators? 
Competition depends on market volume, the 
number of competitors (national / international), 
transparency, etc. In general, a TGC system, a 
tender scheme or a combination of both are 
adequate instruments to achieve competition 
among investors.  
 
7.2.5 How should the premium costs 
(burden) for consumers be  
distributed over time? 
In general, at least as long as RES-E technologies 
are not competitive to conventional power and the 
amount of RES-E increases, the transfer costs for 
consumers rise over time for almost all RES-E sup-
port mechanisms65, maybe not per MWh, but in total 
as RES-E capacity increase.66  
If a simultaneous support scheme for different tech-
nologies is applied, e.g. via a feed-in tariff, costs are 
(relatively) higher in the early phase of the system 
compared to strategies that only support the cur-
rently most cost efficient technologies, e.g. a TGC 
scheme. The reason is that higher costs for promot-
ing more expensive generation options already oc-
cur in the initial phase.  
                                                          
65 The only exception is the ‘investment incentive’ instrument. Costs 
related to this mechanism are already high in the first years and 
can - but may not - decrease over time.  
66 Note: total costs for the consumer may not increase, since the 
RES-E displaces conventional electricity, which may leads to a re-
duction in power price. 
 - 30 - 
Build up phase Full phase of the system
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Figure 7.4 Transfer costs for society applying an instrument with simultaneous  
support (feed-in tariff / FIT) and a mechanism promoting only the  
currently most cost efficient technologies (TGC scheme) 
 
In the mature phase costs can either (slightly) in-
crease, be stable or (slightly) decrease. The net ef-
fect depends on the duration of the financial support, 
the RES-E target and technological learning rate. 
However, the cost increase is lower67 if (i) a higher 
potential for the most cost efficient technologies is 
still available, (ii) the yearly available potential of 
medium cost efficient technologies is available in a 
higher magnitude68 and (iii) generation costs of 
these technologies are lower due to technological 
learning. 
If the burden increases significantly over time, there 
is the threat that the public acceptance decreases 
significantly. Consequently, the political pressure 
rise to change the instrument, leading to all negative 
consequences of a low long-term instability, not ful-
filment of the initial targets etc.  
The context is schematically illustrated in Figure 7.4 
and Figure 6.13.  
 
7.2.6 How does international burden 
sharing look like? 
An accepted international burden sharing as well as 
a breakdown of this target an the Member State 
level are one of the crucial issues in finding a joint 
EU wide long-term (e.g. 2020) RES-E target.  
A fair burden sharing among (the electricity consum-
ers within) the different countries means that the ad-
ditional costs due to RES-E generation is equal in 
terms of additional costs per total electricity con-
sumed.69  
In this respect it is also crucial how to assess the 
(distribution of the) additional benefits due to RES-E 
                                                          
67 The cost reduction is higher if costs increase over time. 
68 In addition, due to the higher availability of the annual potential, it 
is not necessary to apply the most expensive generation options. 
69 This does not mean that all costs should be imposed directly and 
equally on the power price. 
generation among the countries. Figure 7.5 illus-
trates the possible allocation in a fictive two country 
(country A and B) example. In the upper part it is as-
sumed that all countries benefits from the RES-E 
production in the same way, i.e. as benefits are dis-
tributed equally, the costs should be borne equally 
too. The middle part of Figure 7.5 shows the situa-
tion assuming that all benefits of national RES-E 
generation remains in their own country, i.e. country 
B do not benefit from RES-E production in country A 
and vice versa. Under this assumption no compen-
sation payments between country A and B are nec-
essary. In reality the distribution between national 
and international benefits from RES-E deployment is 
between the two extreme cases – all countries bene-
fit from RES-E generation in one country to the 
same extent and no benefits in another country oc-
cur. This situation is illustrated in the lower part of 
Figure 7.5. Considering national and international 
benefits, a trade-off between the countries should re-
fer to the international relevant part only. Of course, 
to be able to assess national and international bene-
fits a more detailed analysis including a macro-
economic investigation is necessary. 70, 71 
 
                                                          
70 National relevant benefits include e.g. rural and regional devel-
opment, employment, local pollution, etc. 
71 International benefits refer to reduction of CO2 emissions due to 
international trade (high if power market is liberalised and intercon-
nected), effects on power price, industrial development, etc. 
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Costs due to RES-E generation Cost sharing among the countries
All benefits are allocated as international gains only
National benefits due the RES-E generation 
(employment, rural development, etc.)
Net additional costs due the RES-E generation,
internationally relevant 
(= additional costs – national benefits)
Additional costs due the RES-E generation for
producers, which must / should be reimbursed 
to generators
Average net additional costs due the RES-E 
generation, internationally relevant 
Additional (transfer) costs for society due to 
unique burden sharing
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Costs
[Euro/MWhel]
BA BA
Transfer
Costs due to RES-E generation Cost sharing among the countries
Benefits are allocated as national and international gains
National benefits due the RES-E generation 
(employment, rural development, etc.)
Net additional costs due the RES-E generation,
internationally relevant 
(= additional costs – national benefits)
Additional costs due the RES-E generation for
producers, which must / should be reimbursed 
to generators
Average net additional costs due the RES-E 
generation, internationally relevant 
Additional (transfer) costs for society due to 
unique burden sharing
 
Figure 7.5 Possible allocations of RES-E costs among the countries A and B 
 
 
How can such a burden sharing look like applying 
different support schemes? Generally, an interna-
tional TGC system differs from the other support 
mechanisms with respect to burden sharing.  
► International TGC system:  
The transfer costs for consumers depend on the 
agreed (national) RES-E target and not on the 
actual national RES-E production. While a high 
target leads to a high burden, a low target results 
in low additional costs for consumers.  
A homogenous and ‘fair’ distribution of the RES-
E costs among the (society within the) countries 
is possible if the targets are set in a way that the 
internationally relevant costs are set uniformly 
among the (consumers) in the countries. Differ-
ences in the share among the countries appears 
only due to the variation of the national benefits 
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from RES-E production. The advantage of an in-
ternational trading scheme is that no additional 
compensation payments among the countries 
are necessary, if the allocation of the national 
target following such a procedure. All distortions 
in the RES-E costs will be ‘fully’ compensated by 
trans-border trading of TGCs. In the case that all 
costs should be compensated internationally the 
national RES-E targets should be set uniform 
among the Member States, leading to the same 
direct transfer costs for consumers among the 
countries. 
► All other support schemes  
In the case of a feed-in tariff scheme, a tender 
procedure or other price-driven support schemes 
like an investment incentive or tax relief the 
transfer costs for society depends on the actual 
RES-E generation within the country and the in-
stalled capacity respectively.  
This means, higher transfer costs are imposed 
on consumers in countries with a (relatively) high 
RES-E potential compared with consumers in 
countries with a low (and cheap) RES-E poten-
tial. Hence, it is more difficult to reach harmoni-
sation of the burden among the Member States. 
One remedy is to install a central (international) 
cost balance or fund system, collecting the inter-
nationally relevant costs / benefits and distribut-
ing them appropriately among the (generators) in 
the countries, see Figure 7.7. Hence, in contrast 
to an international TGC scheme additional ad-
ministration effort is necessary reaching a ‘fair’ 
distribution of the costs for RES-E deployment. 
Transfer payments into the international fund de-
creases if the national benefits from RES-E rise. 
No compensation payments are necessary as-
suming that all benefits due to the promotion of 
RES-E remain within the country. Note, also 
within an international TGC scheme a compre-
hensive negotiation process is necessary reach-
ing a ‘fair’ burden sharing agreement between 
the Member States. 
Considering the different entity of an international 
TGC scheme and the other mechanisms a combina-
tion of international TGC scheme with other policies 
must be implemented carefully, otherwise distortions 
occur among the countries and the technologies, re-
spectively. If investment incentives for less mature 
technologies were granted to increase their share 
and to reduce windfall profits for the most cost effi-
cient technologies, transfer costs for consumers in 
those countries actually installing the capacity rise. 
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Figure 7.6 Trade-off within an international trading scheme 
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Figure 7.7 Trade-off within a feed-in tariff scheme, a tender procedure, national TGC  
or other price driven schemes 
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7.2.7 Should the system be  
implemented at the national  
or international level 
In this context it is most important whether the power 
market is open or closed. 
Assuming an international power market, no distor-
tions occur when implementing either a national or 
an international scheme. In the case of a not fully 
open international power market, i.e. with restricted 
electricity exchange due to limited interconnections 
distortions occur in an international TGC scheme. 
RES-E deployment in countries with high respective 
power prices is favoured. The reason is that the total 
revenue from the purchase of the electricity from 
RES plants consists of the revenue from the (higher) 
power market price and the internationally (constant) 
TGC price, increasing the total price signal for in-
vestments (marginal generation costs). 
In addition, the question depends on the national 
(indicative) RES-E target. On (a weighted) average, 
countries gain from the introduction of an interna-
tional TGC system. However, some countries are 
worse off in an international compared to a national 
system. This fact should be considered in the nego-
tiation process for implementing an international 
TGC system. 
7.2.8 Summary 
Table 7.1 summarises which instrument is most ap-
propriate for reaching the corresponding political ob-
jective. Note the discussed effects refer to the most 
common design option of the instrument, i.e. by 
changing the design most effects can be changed 
too. It is assumed in more detail that: 
• Feed-in tariffs are technology specific and de-
crease with technological progress 
• Quota obligations based on TGCs are uniform, 
i.e. there are neither technology specific quotas 
nor additional support for less cost efficient  
RES-E options (e.g. tax relief or investment  
subsidies). 
• Tender schemes are technology specific, but to 
maintain competition less specific than under a 
feed-in tariff system 
It is worth mentioning that quite different effects oc-
cur applying different design options (e.g. imple-
menting technology specific quotas within a TGC 
scheme or using no technology specific feed-in  
tariffs).  
Also, the inherent characteristics of the different 
RES-E technologies should be taken into account, 
as well as national/regional peculiarities. In this con-
text is worth mentioning that the different support 
mechanisms are highly influenced by the political 
stability of the schemes. 
 
 
Table 7.1 Optimal RES-E policy in dependency of the core issue 
Policy issue Feed-in tariff A National TGC system B 
International 
TGC system B 
Tender  
procedure C 
Ensure a broad RES-E technology port-
folio + + - - -  + + 
Allow an ambitious RES-E target for a 
short period + + - - - / + + 
Minimise generation system costs - /+ + / - + / - + 
Minimise transfer costs for consumers + + - - / + + 
Encourage competition among genera-
tors - - + + + + + 
Leads to a homogeneous burden 
among consumers over time + + - - + + 
Can contribute to a fair international 
burden sharing for consumers - - + - 
Note: The discussed effects refer to the most common design option of the instrument, i.e. by changing the design most ef-
fects can be changed too.  
A Feed-in tariffs are technology specific and decreases with technological progress 
B  Quota obligations are uniform, i.e. there are neither technology specific quotas nor additional support for less cost efficient 
instruments (e.g. tax relief or investment subsidies) 
C  Tender schemes are technology specific, but to maintain competition less specific than under a feed-in tariff system 
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General rules (harmonised)
• High investor confidence (stable planning horizon, 
predictability, creditability);
• Pursue a continuous RES-E policy (no stop-and-go 
nature);
• Existing capacities and new capacities should not be 
mixed;
• Financial support given by any instrument should be 
restricted to a certain time frame;
• Encourage competition among the manufacturer;
• Remove non economic barriers
• Compatibility with other policies (climate policy, agricultural 
policy , demand-side measures);
Quota obligation
• Ensure reciprocity of TGCs
(mutually approval)
• Set correct penalty (higher than 
marginal production costs)
• Ensure a sufficient market size 
(try to form an international 
trading system
• Give higher additional support 
for less matured technologies (if 
appropriate)
Tender procedure
• Ensure a continuity of calls and 
predictability over time
• Set technology-cluster specific 
tender
• Call of right technology specific 
tender capacity 
• For large projects predefined 
size, site, interconnection, etc. 
(co-ordinated development for 
capacity, grid feasible)
Feed-in tariff
• Use technology specific tariffs
• Apply a stepped feed-in tariff 
scheme (where appropriate)
• Considering dynamics! Tariffs 
should decrease over time 
when optimal time path for their 
implementation is reached
 
Figure 7.8 Efficient design options for RES-E support instruments from the consumer’s perspective 
 
For example, in the case of a feed-in tariff scheme 
problems may occur if the guaranteed tariffs are set 
inappropriate. This means if the amount of the tariff 
is more a result of bargaining process with interest 
groups than of an assessment of the necessary 
support to become economic for a certain technol-
ogy. Also decisions which are based on short term 
gains instead of a stable long term strategy are criti-
cal. Similar to a feed in tariff, the allocation of the 
technology portfolio within a tender scheme or a na-
tional TGC system can be influenced significantly by 
various stakeholders and lobby groups negatively, 
leading to distortions and inefficient allocations 
among the different RES-E technologies.  
Shifting the promotion of RES-E at the EU level 
means that the European Commission is responsible 
for the stability of the scheme and not 15 or 25 na-
tional governments. Hence, it is more difficult to 
change the framework conditions driven by policy 
pressure from different interest groups on national 
level. A good example in this context is the Euro-
pean emissions allowance trading scheme. Despite 
extensive discussions and disapproval from national 
interest groups the system is being implemented. 
However, it is necessary to design such a concept 
carefully. 
 
7.3 What can a harmonised ap-
proach look like? 
Based on both theoretical analysis and the results of 
the simulation results, it is useful to harmonise policy 
goals for new RES-E technologies at the EU level.  
Agreeing on the same ambitious of RES-policy 
among the countries – this does not mean that each 
country must reach the same RES-E target, but 
rather applies the same effort to promote RES-E - 
significantly reduces the threat that single countries 
postpone their RES-E deployment for strategic rea-
sons. This means that countries wait until generation 
costs decline due to technological learning, caused 
by the RES-E development in the other countries72. 
In principle, two options exist for reaching harmoni-
sation:  
► Full harmonisation 
If joint agreement is reached on which policy ob-
jectives (as discussed above) are most important 
and, hence, should be consequently realised, a 
full harmonised approach is preferable.  
                                                          
72 Under this condition, the main costs are borne by the society in 
those countries investing in this technology first. Of course, this 
country has the first-mover advantage of developing its own RES-E 
industry. 
 - 35 - 
► Sub-harmonisation 
Based on the traditions of different Member 
States it is likely that they will not find a joint 
agreement, which support scheme may be ap-
plied in the future exclusively to promote  
RES-E. If this is the case it is important that a 
harmonisation of the general framework condi-
tions takes place. This means that the Member 
States establish clear rules of the framework 
conditions for the different promotion schemes if 
applied at the national level73. Common general 
rules can reduce distortions among the producer 
and consumer.  
Figure 7.8 provides a suggested design of efficient 
instruments so as to minimise costs for consumers. 
For more details with respect to the design, we refer 
to chapter 5. 
 
7.4 Summary and final remarks 
The knowledge gained from carrying out the  
Green-X project can be summarised as follows:  
• There is no clear favoured support mechanism, 
as each instrument has its pro and cons. Which 
instrument is to be preferable depends on the 
specific policy objective, see e.g. Table 7.1 
• Considering dynamics is essential, as the impact 
of the instruments significantly varies from a 
static viewpoint. Of special importance is:  
– Technological diffusion due to changes of ex-
isting barriers over time 
– Decreasing generation costs and hence 
lower necessary financial incentives 
– Non-linear dynamic target /quota setting 
• The design of an effective strategy is by far the 
most important success criteria. The effects on 
RES-E deployment, investor stability, conven-
tional power generation and its emission and 
prices are similar if the design of the instrument 
is similar too. Of course, as the instrument dif-
fers, the effort, the efficiency and complexity of 
reaching a similar impact varies among the sup-
port schemes too; 
• To ensure a significant RES-E deployment in the 
long-term, it is essential to build up a broad port-
folio of different RES-E technologies. 
– To increase experience and confidence in 
new technologies. This issue is important to 
                                                          
73 Of course, interaction exists between different schemes: For ex-
ample, a TGC system gains from the existence of a feed-in tariff 
scheme, as the costs of less efficient technologies decline due to 
technological learning, which in turn leads to lower transfer costs 
for consumers.  
prepare the market for the case that these 
technologies can be used in the future. 74  
– Demonstrating the viability of new technolo-
gies is important for achieving market matur-
ity, as the overcoming of barriers depends on 
the confidence and experience gained from 
real projects. For example, banking institu-
tions must be familiar and must trust in new 
technologies, and the risk assessment for 
new technologies will be reduced as the 
learning effect in the construction and ad-
ministration occurs; 
• The maximum RES-E deployment rate depends 
on the technological differentiation of the single 
RES-E technologies. Applying technology spe-
cific support schemes, the dynamics with respect 
to the total RES-E deployment can be signifi-
cantly increased; 
• Coordination and harmonisation of the support 
mechanism between the Member States leads to 
lower transfer costs for consumer; 
• The development of a national RES-E industry 
requires a continuous RES-E policy; 
• Implementing national policies in a different am-
bitious way among the countries is problematic 
within a liberalised power market. The benefits of 
ambitious policies only partly remain within the 
respective countries. Harmonisation of frame-
work conditions and the associated burdens for 
consumer should be pursued; 
• The future development of societal costs due to 
the promotion of RES-E is crucially influenced by 
the development of electricity prices on the con-
ventional market. Thereby, a higher societal bur-
den due to higher electricity prices will be com-
pensated by lower societal costs related to the 
promotion of RES-E; 
• The achievement of most policy targets for  
RES-E at acceptable societal costs is closely 
linked to the development of the electricity de-
mand, too. Therefore, besides setting incentives 
on the supply-side for RES-E, accompanying 
demand-side measures would help to minimise 
the overall societal burden; 
• Accompanying strategies to promote RES-E, 
such as a tradable emissions allowances system 
or an active DSM policy, are less efficient if they 
are introduced in an uncoordinated manner (on a 
national level) within an international power mar-
ket, as the power price only reacts marginally on 
such policies compared to both an isolated elec-
tricity market and an internationally coordinated 
policy. 
                                                          
74 Especially if the RES-E target increases significantly in the  
future. 
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